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Worldwide financial markets increasingly depend on structures
that reduce risk by interposing intermediaries between investors and
the companies obligated to pay them. This reduction of risk may be
offset, however, by the risk that an intermediary will fail, and its
creditors then will claim against assets held by the intermediary for the
benefit of investors. If the intermediary holds assets solely in a custo-
dial capacity, this risk traditionally is addressed by agency and trust
law. What is novel, however, is that intermediaries in a wide range of
domestic and international dealings—including the trading of invest-
ment securities, the sale of loan participations, and securitization
transactions—now hold assets in which they, as well as investors,
share beneficial rights. The sharing of these rights creates significant
uncertainty as to whether the intermediary’s creditors can look to all
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those assets, or merely to the intermediary’s interest therein, for re-
payment. This “intermediary risk” not only affects individual inves-
tors and increases transaction costs but also can be systemic: the fail-
ure of an intermediary may trigger a chain reaction of failures of
investing institutions that contract with the intermediary. Moreover,
the problem of intermediary risk raises innovative legal issues that
blur the boundaries between commercial law and property. This Arti-
cle analyzes how legal systems worldwide should respond to this risk.
It concludes that a uniform rule is needed to regulate intermediary
risk in cross-border commercial and financial transactions, and it ex-
amines how such a rule should be implemented in an international
law context.
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I.  THE PROBLEM
Companies need large amounts of financing to compete in a
global economy. Investors that provide the financing, however, usu-
ally want to limit their risk by diversifying the source of repayment.1
Thus, investors often invest relatively small amounts in each of many
companies, including firms in other sovereign states or countries
(each, a “state”), rather than investing a large amount in a single
company.2 Investors also can limit their risk by investing in future
payment streams owing from a statistically large number of compa-
nies.3 Some investors may use a combination of these techniques. In
each case, the investment bargain fixes the particular assets—con-
sisting of claims against, or future payment streams owing from, these
companies—that constitute the source of repayment.
A curious pattern has evolved: regardless of the states in which
they are located, markets are diversifying investment risk by inter-
posing intermediaries to hold these assets for the benefit of multiple
investors. For example, brokers are intermediaries with respect to in-
vestment securities, in which they sell fractional undivided interests
(“undivided interests”) to investors; banks are intermediaries with re-
spect to loans, in which they sell undivided interests (“participations”)
to third parties, usually other banks; and companies are intermediar-
ies with respect to receivables, in which they use securitization to sell
undivided interests to investment vehicles. In each case, these sales
are made in order to diversify and thereby reduce risk.4
To some extent this is old news. There is a long tradition, for ex-
ample, of intermediaries (called trustees or agents) holding securities
in a custodial capacity on behalf of multiple investors.5 What is novel,
1. See infra Part II (explaining how this is accomplished).
2. This pattern of investment diversification, known as “portfolio theory,” applies for both
domestic and international investments. See generally RICHARD DOBBINS & STEPHEN F. WITT,
PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 13-14 (1983) (discussing the theoretical
underpinnings of modern portfolio theory); GLOBAL PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION: RISK
MANAGEMENT, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE, AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 1-2 (Raj
Aggarwal & David C. Schirm eds., 1995) (reporting “increasing evidence of international
diversification of investment portfolios”).
3. This is called securitization. See infra Part II.C (explaining securitization).
4. Intermediaries thus act as a link between diversified investors and issuers.
5. Trust indentures, which are “contract[s] entered into between a corporation issuing
bonds or debentures and a trustee for the holders of the bonds or debentures which delineate[ ]
the rights of the holders and the issuer,” exemplify this tradition. 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities
Regulation – Federal § 872 (1993). As early as 1934, approximately $40 billion in corporate debt
securities were issued under trust indenture agreements. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
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however, is that in a wide range of international commercial and fi-
nancial transactions, intermediaries hold assets in which they, as well
as investors, share rights that entitle them to some direct beneficial or
equitable interest in these assets (“beneficial rights”).6 This typically
occurs where the owner of an asset sells undivided interests therein to
investors, retains an undivided interest for itself, but continues to
hold, as intermediary, the entire asset for itself and the other inves-
tors.7
Even though this use of intermediaries reduces investment risk,
part of the reduction may be offset by the separate risk (“intermedi-
ary risk”) that, in the event of an intermediary’s failure, creditors of
the failed intermediary can claim against assets held by the interme-
diary for the benefit of investors. If the intermediary has no beneficial
rights in those assets, intermediary risk traditionally is addressed by
agency and trust law and, I will show, is minimal.8
There is, however, no clearly established body of law that ad-
dresses intermediary risk where the intermediary and investors share
beneficial rights in assets held by the intermediary. For example,
[S]ecurities today are generally held indirectly through multiple tiers
of intermediaries. Cross-border investment requires not only tiering
of intermediaries, but also involvement by intermediaries in differ-
ent countries, with each tier being subject to a different country’s
laws. Existing national laws contain unnecessary ambiguities when
applied to such multi-tiered securities holding systems.9
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 194 (rev. ed. 1995). Also, the purchase of
locomotives, railcars, and other forms of rolling stock has long been financed by mortgaging the
equipment to a trustee who holds the mortgage on behalf of investors. CHARLES J. WOELFEL,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING & FINANCE 345 (10th ed. 1994).
6. An intermediary therefore would have beneficial rights in an asset only if it were
entitled to some direct benefit from that asset, as opposed to holding the asset solely in a
custodial capacity for investors and receiving a fee or other compensation for acting in that
capacity.
7. See infra Part II (describing transaction patterns). This differs from the simple pattern
in which an intermediary occasionally holds the same type of asset for investors and itself
beneficially but is able (and, indeed, usually required by law) to segregate the holdings. JOANNA
BENJAMIN, INTERESTS IN SECURITIES § 2.2.3.1, at 51 (forthcoming 2001) (June 15, 2000 draft at
51, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
8. See infra Part III.A. The term “custody risk” sometimes is used to describe
intermediary risk in this context. Custody risk is therefore a subset—indeed, I will show it is the
trivial case—of intermediary risk.
9. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, Brussels Office, as Operator of the
Euroclear Sys., Cross-Border Clearance, Settlement and Custody: Beyond the G30
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This legal void creates significant uncertainty as to whether the in-
termediary’s creditors can look to all those assets, or merely to the in-
termediary’s interest therein, for repayment.10 That uncertainty in
turn increases the costs for parties engaging in these transactions and
may discourage certain of these transactions altogether.11
This Article focuses on intermediary risk. As a practical matter,
intermediary risk is important not only because it affects individual
investors but also because it can be systemic. The failure of an inter-
mediary can cause a chain reaction of failures of institutions that have
invested in assets held by the intermediary.12 Indeed, because of the
international tiering of intermediaries, such a chain reaction, if it in-
volved an intermediary holding a large enough quantity of assets,
could threaten the very stability of the global financial system.13 For
this reason, one of the primary purposes of financial regulation is to
manage systemic risk.14
As a theoretical matter, intermediary risk is important because it
raises complex and unique legal issues that blur the boundaries be-
tween commercial law and property, requiring innovative legal solu-
Recommendations xiii (June 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law
Journal); see also Richard Potok, Legal Certainty for Securities Held as Collateral, INT’L FIN. L.
REV., Dec. 1999, at 12, 12:
[I]t is no wonder that financial institutions are paying more attention to the legal risk
associated with taking securities held through multiple tiers of intermediaries . . . .
[because] in the last decade there has been a sharp increase in the number of
arrangements within the financial services industry . . . involving a cross-border
element.
10. Dr. Joanna Benjamin wryly notes that the “Roman term for the mixing together of
assets which belong to different persons and which are not divided into distinct units is
confusio.” BENJAMIN, supra note 7, § 2.2.3.2, at 54.
11. Cf. Michael J. Whincop, Conflicts in the Cathedral: Towards a Theory of Property
Rights in Private International Law, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 41, 44-45 (2000) (arguing that property
cannot be efficiently traded unless the parties know the applicable law).
12. See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (analyzing systemic risk).
13. Cf. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and
Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 413
(1990) (noting the primary importance of the issue of intermediary risk); James Steven Rogers,
Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1431, 1450 (1996) (arguing
that the first element of the “core of the package of rights and duties that define the relationship
between a securities intermediary and a person . . . who holds a securities position through that
intermediary” is that such person “does not take the credit risk of the intermediary’s other
business activities; that is, property held by the intermediary is not subject to the claims of the
intermediary’s general creditors”).
14. JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCE AT RISK 19, 197 (2000).
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tions.15 Moreover, the analysis of intermediary risk yields insights into
resolution of the broader issue of whether rights of one party in as-
sets, in which a second party also shares rights, will be subject to
claims of the second party’s creditors.
This Article analyzes how legal systems worldwide should re-
spond to intermediary risk. The analysis depends, of course, on a
clear understanding of this risk. Three transaction patterns dominate:
the indirect holding system for debt and equity investment securities
(“securities”), in which intermediary risk is addressed, at least in the
United States, by newly revised Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code; the sale of bank loan participations; and the securitization of
receivables.16 I introduce each in turn to provide a perspective for the
analysis that follows.
The analysis then shows that the issue of intermediary risk is
generally unresolved under existing legal systems. Although some
states resolve it by statute in the context of a single transaction pat-
tern, there has been no attempt to examine intermediary risk in a
larger context. I attempt to do so by starting from first principles. Part
III argues that, for each of the foregoing transaction patterns, a credi-
tor of the intermediary should only be able to reach the intermedi-
ary’s, and not an investor’s, interest. Part IV examines how this nor-
mative rule should be implemented into law, taking into account that
many of these transactions cross national borders and, therefore, any
law would have to bind parties in different states. Part IV.C concludes
that the rule should be implemented as a uniform model law. Finally,
Appendix A proposes a draft of that law.17
II.  PATTERNS OF INTERMEDIARY RISK
This part examines the three dominant transaction patterns in
order to provide a perspective for the analysis in Part III. No state has
yet attempted to address intermediary risk beyond the context of in-
15. For an argument that much of commercial law is property law, carrying the same
ideological freight that is taken for granted in property law but rarely acknowledged in
commercial law, see generally Carl S. Bjerre, Commerce and Community: The Redistributionist
Streak in American Commercial Law (Dec. 20, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
16. The similarities of these transaction patterns implicitly challenge the claim by drafters
of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code that the legal relationship between intermediaries
and investors under the indirect holding system for securities is “sui generis.” U.C.C., Prefatory
Note to art. 8, part III.B (amended 1994).
17. See infra Appendix A (Proposed Model Law to Regulate Intermediary Risk).
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dividual transaction patterns. I show, however, that from the stand-
point of intermediary risk, the intrinsic structure of each of these pat-
terns is identical: a financing in which money flows through an inter-
mediary. A unified approach to resolving this risk may well be
appropriate.
A. Indirect Holding System for Securities
The first of these three transaction patterns arises from the de-
cline of the traditional system for direct holding of securities. Under
the traditional system, individual securities were issued to investors
that in turn had the right to trade those securities to other investors.18
An indirect holding system has evolved in its place, under which in-
termediary entities—which I will refer to as “securities intermediar-
ies”19—not only hold the securities on behalf of investors but also fre-
quently own beneficial rights in those securities. Investors are
concerned, however, that creditors of a failed intermediary may assert
their rights against the investors’ interests in those securities.
Under the indirect holding system, issuers generally record own-
ership of their securities as belonging to one or more depository in-
termediaries.20 Although securities held through a depository inter-
mediary are often evidenced by physical certificates,21 these
18. The traditional securities holding system evidenced investor ownership of securities
either by physical possession of certificates or by book ownership, i.e., marking the issuer’s (or
its transfer agent’s) books and records. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 5-7 (5th ed. 2000). The analysis in my Article applies irrespective of which
of these methods is used to evidence investor ownership.
19. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14) (1994) (using this same definition).
20. U.C.C., Prefatory Note to art. 8, part I.D (amended 1994). In the United States, the
depository is ordinarily The Depository Trust Company, or DTC. With limited exceptions,
however, DTC itself “does not normally take a position in securities. It serves only as a
custodian.” E-mail from Stephen Letzler, Director, Corporate Communications, Depository
Trust Company, to Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (June
30, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Hence, the intermediary risk discussed in this
Article would not ordinarily apply to DTC as intermediary but would (absent Article 8 of the
UCC) apply to “lower-tier” intermediaries of DTC. See infra note 42 and accompanying text
(restating the same definition of intermediary risk). The author also appreciates the helpful
comments of DTC’s Carl H. Urist on notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
21. In this context, it should be noted that students of the indirect holding system
sometimes confuse that system with the “book entry” system for transferring uncertificated
securities. These systems are only coincidentally related. If securities exist in tangible form, it
sometimes might be necessary to physically transfer them to evidence change of ownership.
More commonly, however, such transfers are simply noted in the securities intermediary’s
books. Recording a transfer instead of physically transferring a tangible certificate reduces both
transaction costs and the risk of loss associated with such a transfer. HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A.
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certificates remain in that intermediary’s possession and are never
delivered to third parties.22 The depository intermediary records the
identities of other intermediaries, such as brokerage firms or banks,
that purchase interests in these securities.23 Those other intermediar-
ies in turn record the identities of investors that purchase interests in
the intermediaries’ interests.24
To illustrate how this works, consider an investor that wishes to
invest in 500 shares of ABC Corporation’s stock. In theory, that in-
vestor could purchase 500 individual shares of ABC stock from a
brokerage firm; however, for reasons discussed below, the broker
may not directly hold individual shares.25 Companies often issue secu-
rities in very large, indivisible blocks.26 For purposes of this example,
assume that ABC issued a certificate for 1,000,000 shares of its stock
to a depository. If a broker then wishes to purchase 50,000 shares of
ABC stock, some perhaps for its own account and some for custom-
ers, it would pay the depository for those shares.27 In return, the bro-
ker would receive a 5% undivided, or pro rata, interest in the
1,000,000 share certificate.28 If the investor then seeks to purchase 500
shares of ABC stock from that broker, the investor would pay the
broker for those shares and, in return, would receive a 1% undivided
interest in the broker’s 5% undivided interest.29 
WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 803 (6th ed. 1999). Whether or not the securities exist in
tangible form, however, the legal risk on which this Article focuses is the same.
22. U.C.C., Prefatory Note to art. 8, part I.D.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (showing that the indirect holding system
reduces the costs and lowers the risk of loss of direct holding).
26. Especially in the case of debt securities, a single certificate referred to as a “global” or
“jumbo” certificate may evidence these securities.
27. The depository then would turn over that payment to ABC. Although the actual
payment mechanics sometimes might work differently (e.g., in underwritten securities
offerings), the differences would not be relevant to this Article’s analysis of intermediary risk.
28. 1,000,000 shares (held by depository) x 5% (broker’s interest) = 50,000 share
equivalent.
29. 1,000,000 shares (held by depository) x 5% (broker’s interest) x 1% (investor’s interest)
= 500 share equivalent. There are two clarifications to the foregoing example. In practice, the
broker is most likely to buy equivalent shares in order to accommodate a simultaneous sale to
the investor. Also, at least under Article 8, the actual records would reflect the flat number of
shares (in my example, 500) to avoid any confusion if the broker’s undivided interest in the
certificate later increases. E-mail from Carl S. Bjerre, Professor of Law, University of Oregon,
and co-author of THE ABCS OF THE UCC, ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES (1997), to
Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (July 17, 2000). These
technicalities, however, are irrelevant to my arguments.
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The rationale for indirect holding. The indirect holding system is
decisively replacing direct holding because it reduces the overall costs
and complexities of record-keeping and lowers the risk of loss occa-
sioned by physically transferring securities. Investors, for example,
obtain expert safekeeping services rather than running the risk of
keeping physical possession of their own certificates, assure them-
selves of the ability to transfer securities rapidly in settlement of
trades, and obtain professional services in the complex record
keeping involved in tracking their investments, distributions, calls,
and the like.30
Thus, in the United States, institutional investors such as insurance
companies, mutual funds, and pension funds “almost invariably use
the indirect holding system.”31 In fact, the “[s]ettlement of market
trading . . . is now effected primarily through some form of” indirect
holding system in most of the major U.S. securities markets, including
virtually all markets for publicly traded corporate equity, corporate
debt, and municipal debt securities.32
Cross-border use of indirect holding. For these same reasons, in-
direct holding is also “widely used in global trading” of securities.33
30. James S. Rogers, Revised UCC Article 8: Why It’s Needed, What It Does, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 285,
288 (1994). The UCC also notes that:
[t]ransfer of securities in the traditional certificate-based system was a complicated,
labor-intensive process. Each time securities were traded, the physical certificates had
to be delivered from the seller to the buyer, and in the case of registered securities the
certificates had to be surrendered to the issuer or its transfer agent for registration of
transfer. As is well known, the mechanical problems of processing the paperwork for
securities transfers reached crisis proportions in the late 1960s, leading to calls for the
elimination of the physical certificates and development of modern electronic systems
for recording ownership of securities and transfers of ownership.
U.C.C., Prefatory Note to art. 8, part I.A (amended 1994).
31. Rogers, supra note 30, at 288.
32. U.C.C., Prefatory Note to art. 8, part I.A. Commercial paper, mortgage-backed
securities, and U.S. Treasury securities trading markets also have instituted indirect holding
systems. Id.
33. Roy Goode, The Nature and Transfer of Rights in Dematerialized and Immobilized
Securities, in THE FUTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET, LEGAL AND REGULATORY
ASPECTS 107, 110 (Fidelis Oditah ed., 1996); see also SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 21, at 806:
[T]here are three principal models for clearing and settlement in the world’s major
stock markets. . . . The second model . . . is one in which there is a central depository
structure, with trade matching and confirmation services provided by the
exchanges. . . . There are variations on this model with differing degrees of settlement
services provided by the depository. . . . The third model has not only a stock market
and a central depository, but also a clearinghouse that stands between the stock
market and depository to reduce risk.
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Sometimes the securities intermediaries are transnational organiza-
tions. For example, securities traded through Euroclear, the world’s
largest securities intermediary for internationally traded securities,34
are held by local depositories that are members of the Euroclear de-
pository network.35 Other times, the securities intermediaries are na-
tional entities that have created linkages
through which a non-resident of the country of issue of a security
could effect settlement of a cross-border trade: (1) through direct
access to (membership in) the [securities intermediary] in the coun-
try of issue, e.g. DTC in the United States; (2) through a local agent
[that is a member of the securities intermediary in the country of is-
sue]; (3) through a global custodian that employs a local agent as
sub-custodian; (4) through a [securities intermediary] in the non-
resident’s own country that has established a link [to the securities
intermediary] in the country of issue; or (5) through an [interna-
tional securities intermediary], e.g. Euroclear or [CEDEL], that has
established a direct or indirect (through a local agent) link to the se-
curities intermediary in the country of issue.36
For example, if an investor wants to purchase shares of a company
from State X whose stock is also listed on a foreign stock exchange in
State Y, the exchange’s securities intermediary in State Y would ac-
count for the trade through its link with a securities intermediary in
State X that holds those shares.37 If there is no such link, the securities
(quoting U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, TRADING AROUND THE CLOCK:
GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, ch. 5 (1990) [hereinafter
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT]); Goode, supra, at 107 (observing that in order to promote
cross-border investment and trading in securities, international securities markets have moved
from a direct holding system to an indirect holding system “through one or more tiers of
custodian[s] [in which] internationally traded securities [are immobilized] by deposit with the
international central securities depositories [and in which] permanent global notes [are issued]
instead of individual definite certificates”); Potok, supra note 9, at 12 (stating that in the last
decade there has been a sharp increase in cross-border trading).
34. Euroclear, About the Euroclear Group, at http://www.euroclear.com/eoc/default.asp
(last visited March 25, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Euroclear is operated by
Euroclear Bank, S.A., a market-owned Belgian bank that assumed the operation of the
Euroclear System on December 31, 2000, from Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York,
which had created and operated the system since 1968. Id. Euroclear Participants are firms
engaged professionally in the securities markets that meet admission criteria based on, among
other things, financial soundness and reputation in the market. Id.
35. SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 21, at 845.
36. Id. at 839-40.
37. See id. at 840 (giving as an example the purchase of IBM shares listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange). The underlying certificate usually would be held by a securities intermediary
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first would have to be delivered to a securities intermediary in State X
that had such a link before the securities intermediary in State Y
could account for the trade.38 This pattern avoids the transaction costs
and risk of loss caused by physically moving the securities from State
X to State Y.39
States are only now beginning to grapple with the intermediary
risk raised by indirect holding.40 Investors want to know that their
in the company’s home state because that is where most of the trades with respect to those
securities would be expected to occur.
38. Id. at 840.
39. See id. (explaining that without these linkages, “[s]ecurities would [have to] be
constantly moved in and out of the trading country”).
40. Although there are numerous legal risks associated with indirect holding of securities,
only intermediary risk is unique to an indirect holding system; other legal risks arise in any
securities holding system and are addressed by traditional legal disciplines, such as the laws of
contract, agency, corporations, and securities regulation. To understand why, consider
the differing roles of the broker in a typical securities transaction, in which the broker
acts as agent for the customer. When a customer directs a broker to buy or sell
securities for the customer, and the broker executes that trade on a securities
exchange or in the over the counter market, the broker is entering into a contract for
the purchase and sale of the securities as agent of the customer. The rules of the
exchange, practices of the market, or regulatory law will specify when and how that
contract is to be performed.
U.C.C., Prefatory Note to art. 8, part III.B (1994). This Article need not review these
established bodies of law:
Article 8 is in no sense a comprehensive codification of the law governing securities
or transactions in securities . . . [and] is not, and should not be, a comprehensive body
of private law governing the relationship between brokers and their customers, nor a
body of regulatory law to police against improper conduct by brokers or other
intermediaries.
Id. My analysis therefore focuses on intermediary risk. In this context, I also note that there are
non-legal risks associated with indirect securities holding which this Article does not address.
These risks result from the differences between the clearance and settlement processes of the
selling investor’s and buying investor’s markets—a problem that becomes particularly acute
when those markets are in different countries. SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 21, at 805. For
example, an investor in the United States may believe it is protected from these risks by
government guaranties, minimum capital requirements imposed on members of the securities
intermediary, or guaranties provided by the securities intermediaries themselves. Id. at 803. A
securities intermediary may guaranty, for example, that an investor paying for securities will
receive the securities and that an investor transferring ownership of securities will receive
payment therefor. Id. at 804. These protections do not always exist, however, for foreign
securities intermediaries. Id. at 803. Also, differences in the settlement processes may create
trading inefficiencies, such as where settlement is expected to occur the third day after a trade in
the selling investor’s jurisdiction but later or earlier than that date in the buying investor’s
jurisdiction. Id. at 805-06. These nonlegal risks, however, may have practical solutions. For
example, U.S. investors can be educated that local protections may not be available in foreign
markets. Also, investors can limit their risk by knowing their trading partners or contractually
limiting the duration of the settlement process. Cf. id. at 803 (noting the variation among
members of the international community on the goals of clearing and settlement). In any event,
as securities intermediaries adapt to investor demands in order to attract cross-border trading,
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fractional undivided interests in securities held by failed securities in-
termediaries are not subject to the claims of creditors of those inter-
mediaries.41 Securities intermediaries, such as brokers that themselves
own undivided interests in securities held by failed intermediaries,
want to know that those interests are not subject to the claims of
creditors of the failed intermediaries. More generically, any entity—
whether an investor or itself an intermediary—that owns undivided in-
terests in securities held by a failed securities intermediary wants to
know that those interests are not subject to the claims of creditors of
the failed intermediary.
To clarify the following analysis, I will use certain simplifying
terminology when discussing a transaction with more than one securi-
ties intermediary. First, the term “investors” generally will be deemed
to include not only investors but also intermediaries that have rights
in securities held by other intermediaries. Second, when necessary to
avoid confusion, I will refer to a holder of an interest in securities
through an intermediary that itself holds an interest in the securities
through an intermediary as a lower-tier holder, and to that holder’s
interest as lower-tier rights.42 Thus, in the example used earlier in
which a broker holds a 5% interest in 1,000,000 shares of ABC stock
held by a depository and an investor holds a 1% interest in that 5%
interest,43 the investor would be a lower-tier holder (and its interest
would constitute lower-tier rights) with respect to both securities in-
termediaries, whereas the broker would be a lower-tier holder (and
the differences between jurisdictions ultimately will be minimized, in turn minimizing these
risks. See also id. at 828 (discussing proposals by the Group of Thirty that, among other things,
call for “[e]ach country [to] have an effective and fully developed central securities depository,
organized and managed to encourage the broadest possible industry participation”); cf. id. at
803 (“[A]s markets become global, one could expect that investment capital will flow toward
markets that are most attractive on a risk-return basis, and that also have efficient and reliable
clearing and settlement systems.”) (quoting OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 33, ch.
5).
41. As a matter of terminology, this Article has been referring to a fractional undivided
interest as an undivided interest. The fraction also could be expressed, of course, as a
percentage. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (discussing the purchase by a broker
of a 5%, or in fractional terms 5/100, undivided interest in a 1,000,000 share certificate of ABC
stock, and the subsequent purchase by an investor of a 1%, or in fractional terms 1/100,
undivided interest in the broker’s 5% undivided interest).
42. My analysis of the intermediary risk of investors as against creditors of an intermediary
therefore should be construed more generally, because of this simplifying terminology, as
applying to the intermediary risk of any lower-tier intermediary as against creditors of an upper-
tier intermediary.
43. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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its interest would constitute lower-tier rights) only with respect to the
depository. 
Status of indirect holding intermediary risk. The issue of interme-
diary risk in the indirect holding system appears to be resolved only in
the United States and perhaps a handful of other countries.44 This
limited resolution, however, may reflect the complexities of the issue
more than lack of concern. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan has urged other nations to follow the lead of the United
States in eliminating legal uncertainties by modernizing their legal
44. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHE BERNASCONI, THE LAW APPLICABLE TO DISPOSITIONS OF
SECURITIES HELD THROUGH INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEMS 3 (Nov. 2000, Prelim. Doc. No. 1)
(Report of the First Secretary of the Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, to the Working Group of January 2001) (observing in a report on the taking
of investment securities as collateral that “[i]n most jurisdictions, neither the substantive laws
governing securities transactions nor the rules determining the law applicable to such
transactions have been updated adequately to reflect this [risk]”) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). Only a handful of countries appear to have addressed this risk. For example, Japan has
adopted a law providing that parties are presumed to have joint ownership in deposited stocks
according to the records of their account books. Kabukento no Hokan to Furikae ni Kansuru
Horitsu [Law Concerning Keeping of Shares and other Securities], Law. No. 30 of 1984, art. 24.
Korea enacted legislation similar to the Japanese law. Chunggwonkoraebop [Securities and
Exchange Act], Act No. 2920 of 1976, art. 174-4, translated in 11 KOREA LEGIS. RES. INST.,
STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 720 (1997). German law gives investors preference, in
certain circumstances, over creditors of an insolvent custodian with respect to securities owned
by the custodian. BERND RUSTOR, 4 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY (FRG)
§ 39.16[1][e] (1987); Gesetz über die Verwahrund und Anschaffung von Wertpapieren
(Depotgesetz – DepotG) v. 4. Februar 1937 (RGBI. I 171). And Belgian law gives investors title
to their share of dematerialized or immobilized securities. Royal Decree No. 62 Facilitating the
Circulation of Securities (Nov. 10, 1967, as amended Apr. 7, 1995) (Belgium); see also Nina
Hval, Credit Risk Reduction in the International Over-the-Counter Market: Collateralizing the
Net Exposure with Support Agreements, 31 INT’L LAW. 801, 815-16 (1997) (explaining Royal
Decree). Canada also is considering adopting provisions similar to UCC Article 8. See
BERNASCONI, supra, at 21-24 (describing certain provisions in English, Luxembourgian, French,
Italian, and Brazilian law); Eric Spink, Tiered Holding System – Uniform Legislation Project,
Report of the Production Committee (Apr. 30, 1997) (reviewing the Canadian laws governing
securities transactions and proposing significant changes to those laws), available at
http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/current/etiered.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal);
Gilles Thieffry & Julie Lynch Bridson, Minimising Legal Uncertainty in Cross-Border Collateral
Transactions, BANKING 2000, at http://www.bankingmm.com/sexc/sexc11.html (last visited
March 25, 2001) (reporting that “Belgium and Luxembourg, the places of organisation
respectively of the depositories Euroclear and Cedelbank . . . have adopted legislation [intended
to reduce] some of the uncertainty associated with conflict of law issues governing the transfer
and pledge of securities held through financial intermediaries,” and that the European Union
adopted a Directive on Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities [Settlement] Systems
[referring to the European Parliament’s Directive 98/26/EC of May 19, 1998] that is intended to
clarify the conflict of law rules governing collateral transactions in European Union settlement
systems) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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rules on indirect securities holding.45 In May 2000 the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law placed the conflicts of law aspects
of this issue on its priority agenda,46 to be studied in collaboration
with other international organizations including the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the In-
ternational Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT).47 And UNIDROIT recently announced its intention
to address the “need for substantive [law] harmonisation in this
area.”48
45. See Rogers, supra note 13, at 1438 (quoting Chairman Greenspan’s March 3, 1995,
remarks to this effect at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta).
46. E-mail from Christophe Bernasconi, First Secretary, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, to Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law
(June 15, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The Hague Conference, by its mandate,
The Hague Conference on Private International Law, available at http://www.voc.net/nl/hc/
#Operation (last visited Feb. 11, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), is focusing on the
narrower topic of applicable law rules, as opposed to the unification of substantive law rules,
which this Article addresses. See SPECIAL COMMISSION ON GENERAL AFFAIRS AND POLICY OF
THE CONFERENCE 8-12 (May 2000) (providing a link to the Hague Conference’s “Conclusions
of the Special Commission of May 2000 on General Affairs and Policy” which, at 25, explains in
the context of the indirect holding system that “[b]ecause securities have become computerised
and because of the multiple levels of intermediaries, the traditional rule of lex situs is no longer
appropriate in this situation,” and therefore recommends the clarification of “applicable law
rules for securities held through intermediaries [as] a basis for the world-wide adoption of
consistent principles”), available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/genaff.html (last visited
Feb. 11, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also BERNASCONI, supra note 44, at 1
(stating the Special Commission on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference’s
recommendation to include collateral securities as a priority issue in the Conference’s agenda).
For an analysis of the differences between the approaches of this Article and the Hague
Conference, see infra Appendix B.
47. See BERNASCONI, supra note 44, at 4, 61 (noting that although the Hague Conference’s
“proposed Convention will be confined to conflict of laws issues,” harmonizing “the substantive
law relating to the nature of interests in respect of securities held through intermediaries is a
major undertaking that may be considered by UNCITRAL or UNIDROIT in the near future”);
see also E-mail from Harold S. Burman, U.S. Department of State, Office of Legal Adviser
(Private International Law), to Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School
of Law (Aug. 7, 2000) (summarizing an August 3, 2000 teleconference of the Global Electronic
Policy Subcommittee in which there was a consensus that “it may be timely to pursue
unification of substantive rules[, which] has already been suggested as a topic for UNCITRAL
within its secured interest working group”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
48. UNIDROIT Secretariat, Comments on the Proposed Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to the Dispositions of Securities Held Through Indirect Holding Systems 1 (Jan.
2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). UNIDROIT stated that it may address substantive
law harmonization in the context of “the clearing-and-settlement unit of [its] capital markets
projects.” Id. at 1-2; see also E-mail from Herbert Kronke, Secretary General of UNIDROIT, to
Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Oct. 10, 2000) (stating
that “clearing and settlement issues (including the ‘intermediary risk’) are on the UNIDROIT
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The most comprehensive law on this issue is Article 8 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC),49 which was recently revised to ad-
dress concerns that intermediary risk in the indirect holding system
would become systemic.50 The failure of intermediaries is not merely
theoretical. Brokers sometimes fail, and even the failure of clearing-
houses is not unknown.51 If investors in securities held by a failed in-
termediary do not have priority over the claims of the intermediary’s
creditors, those investors may be unable to recoup their investments,
leading to their failure and the chain reaction failure of other institu-
tions to which the investors are obligated.52
work programme as one problem area of the item ‘Transactions on Transnational Capital
Markets’”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
49. The UCC is a uniform law intended for separate enactment by each state of the United
States. See Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of
Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 915-27 (1995) (discussing the status of the UCC and
other uniform state laws in the United States). Article 8 has been enacted in almost all of those
states. Professor Fred Miller reports that:
Revised Article 8 has not only been adopted as the standard for government
securities in the Treasury TRADES Regulation ([31 C.F.R. § 357]) and also in
regulations by UD and the Federal Housing Finance Board, but has gained almost a
universal state enactment as well. To date, 50 jurisdictions have adopted revised
Article 8 and a bill is currently being prepared in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Fred H. Miller, The State of the Uniform Commercial Code—1999, 39 UCC BULL. 2 (1999).
50. See Rogers, supra note 13, at 1437-38 (stating that systemic risk was the motivating
force behind revising Article 8, and giving the example of a firm making bad guesses about the
price movements of a security; if the firm enters into large trades based thereon and then fails,
other firms that hedged their risk with that firm will lose the benefit of their hedging and, if their
hedged positions are large enough, also may fail); Rogers, supra note 30, at 3 (discussing Article
8’s main purpose as controlling systemic risk); cf. id. at 1 (adding that the revision also was
motivated by the desire to eliminate the “inordinate amount of legal time which, of course,
means cost, [that was] required to fit modern securities transactions into the conceptual scheme
of a prior era”). But see Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the
Individual Investor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 615, 626 (2000) (arguing that “in most respects,” the
revisions are unrelated to concerns of systemic risk). Professor Rogers was the Reporter for the
Article 8 revision.
51. See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 21, at 807 (discussing the failure in 1995 of Adler,
Coleman Clearing Corp.); see also Fourth-Biggest Brokerage House in Japan Is Considering
Closing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at D1 (describing the collapse of Yamaichi Securities);
Hong Kong Brokerage Chark Fung Goes Bust, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, June 1, 1998, at 8
(describing the largest brokerage firm failure in the history of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange);
Major Japanese Bank Seeks Nationalization, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at C24 (describing the
collapse of the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan); Trader Linked to Collapse of British Bank,
WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1995, at A1 (describing the collapse of Barings Bank).
52. See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 21, at 805 (discussing systemic risk); Rogers, supra
note 30, at 3 (discussing the systemic “risk that a failure of one securities firm might cause others
to fail”). Professor Rogers suggests that to avoid systemic risk, it also is necessary to clarify the
rights of intermediaries, their creditors, and investors: “‘That’s an interesting question’ is not an
acceptable answer to questions about the legal rights of securities market participants at a time
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Revised Article 8 resolves intermediary risk by clarifying that in-
vestors have property rights in the securities (or interests therein)53
held for them by intermediaries, not merely in personam claims
against the intermediaries.54 Accordingly, these securities and inter-
ests “are not property of the securities intermediary, and are not
subject to claims of creditors of the securities intermediary,”55 except
in specific cases that should not pose the threat of systemic risk.56
Article 8, however, only resolves intermediary risk for the indi-
rect holding system within the United States.57 Unfortunately, there is
when the prospect of the collapse of the financial system is a matter of more than theoretical
concern.” Rogers, supra note 13, at 1449. Part of the reason that intermediary risk has become
particularly troublesome is the increasing trend toward more complex and interwoven corporate
structures. Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers?: The Securities Investor Protection Act,
Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1091 (1999)
(noting that although businesses were traditionallly conducted like partnerships, they are now
“usually incorporated and owned through . . . structures of increasing complexity”).
53. Such an interest would arise where an investor owns an interest in a securities
intermediary’s interest in securities held by another intermediary. For example, in the earlier
illustration, an investor would own a 1% interest in a broker’s 5% interest in the 1,000,000 share
certificate held by a depository. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
54. U.C.C. § 8-503 (2000). One commentator described this provision as setting “the
ground rules for implementing transfers and resolv[ing] disputes that may arise when different
people claim conflicting interests.” Rogers, supra note 30, at 1.
55. U.C.C. § 8-503(a).
56. See infra Part III.B (analyzing whether investors should have priority over creditors of
the intermediary); infra Part IV.B (analyzing whether Article 8’s exceptions should be
incorporated absent a comprehensive regulatory scheme to ensure that investors are protected
against the risk that their ownership interests in securities held by a failed intermediary will be
impaired); see also infra note 157 (noting that stockbroker liquidation in the U.S. may be
governed by special federal distributional rules).
57. Article 8’s choice of law rules are nonetheless helpful to some extent in providing
guidance for cross-border securities transactions. Section 8-110 provides that the local law (i.e.,
the law other than conflict of law rules) of the intermediary’s jurisdiction governs:
(1) acquisition of a security entitlement from the securities intermediary; (2) the
rights and duties of the securities intermediary and entitlement holder [investor]
arising out of a security entitlement; (3) whether the securities intermediary owes any
duties to an adverse claimant to a security entitlement; and (4) whether an adverse
claim can be asserted against a person who acquires a security entitlement from the
securities intermediary.
U.C.C. § 8-110(b). An intermediary’s “jurisdiction” is defined flexibly, though awkwardly, to
include the governing law contractually chosen by the intermediary and the relevant investor.
U.C.C. § 8-110(e)(1). The Official Comment 3 to this section clarifies that, in order to “enable
parties to determine, in advance and with certainty, what law will apply to transactions governed
by this Article [8], the validation of selection of governing law by agreement is not conditioned
upon a determination that the jurisdiction whose law is chosen bear a ‘reasonable relation’ to
the transaction.” U.C.C. § 8-110 cmt. 3. Thus, an investor in the United States and an
intermediary in a foreign state, and arguably even a foreign investor and a foreign intermediary,
could choose Article 8 as the governing law. Cf. Rogers, supra note 30, at 4 (arguing that
Section 8-110 “[a]ccommodates globalization of securities markets by establishing clear choice
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little resolution of this risk for the indirect holding system outside the
United States.58 In that broader context, there remains grave concern
that intermediary risk may become systemic and that a “failure of a
major player will have a domino effect on the market as a whole.”59 
B. Sale of Loan Participations
The central legal issue raised by the sale of loan participations is
the same as that raised by the indirect holding system: what risk arises
when an intermediary and investors share beneficial interests in assets
held by the intermediary?
A “loan participation is an undivided interest in a loan. The bank
that made the loan sells the participation to [a third party (usually]
another bank[)],60 thereby diversifying the lending bank’s credit
of law rules to facilitate planning of international custody and clearing arrangements”). Article
8’s choice of law rules, however, are clearly only the beginning of a solution. Foreign parties are
unlikely to choose U.S. law to govern their relationship. Even if they did, a non-U.S. court might
not enforce their choice of law where the intermediary’s creditors, whose rights would be
affected, are located in the foreign jurisdiction. Furthermore, in examining the rights of a lower-
tier holder, one must consider the rights for each intermediary—otherwise, the lower-tier
holder’s rights, even if safe as against creditors of its intermediary, may be cut off by creditors of
another intermediary. Finally, Article 8 only applies to the indirect holding system, not to
participation or securitization transactions. These choice of law rules are therefore no substitute
for uniform international regulation. But see infra Appendix B (discussing the Hague
Conference on Private International Law’s proposed applicable rule approach).
58. See supra note 44 (indicating the limited number of states that have attempted to
address this problem to date). But see E-mail from Randall Guynn, Partner, Davis, Polk &
Wardwell, to Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Jan. 5,
2001) (arguing from his experience that, at least in a “properly structured global custody
network,” there “is very little risk” that investors would have a mere contractual claim instead
of a property right to securities credited to their accounts) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
59. Goode, supra note 33, at 108; see also GROUP OF THIRTY, CLEARANCE AND
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD’S SECURITIES MARKETS iii (1989) (arguing, in the
context of the indirect holding system, that “the intersection between local practice and growing
volumes and values could, under adverse circumstances, represent a very serious risk to the
world’s financial network”). The potential for systemic risk can be limited by resolving the issue
of intermediary risk in states where the largest intermediaries, such as depositories and
clearinghouses, are located. These tend to be located in states where issuers of securities are
located, irrespective of where such securities might be traded, because the issuer’s home
jurisdiction “is where most of the trades with respect to that security occur.” SCOTT &
WELLONS, supra note 21, at 840. At least at present, there are only a relatively limited number
of states in which multinational corporations, whose securities are likely to be traded
internationally, reside. To limit systemic risk, those states could attempt to agree on how to
resolve the intermediary risk. Nonetheless, even the potential failure of smaller intermediaries,
such as brokers, creates potential for systemic risk. See Rogers, supra note 30, at 3 (discussing
systemic risk of broker failures).
60. Over the past several years, however, the market for “non-traditional” loan
participations sold by banks to non-bank investors, such as insurance companies, mutual funds,
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risk.”61 For example, if a bank lends $2 million to a borrower and
thereafter sells 25% participations in that loan to three other banks
for $500,000 each, the lending bank will continue to hold the entire
loan but has diversified its risk by reducing its credit exposure to this
borrower to only $500,000.62 The lending bank, which sells the partici-
pation, is therefore the intermediary; the bank or other party buying
the participation (customarily referred to as a “participant”) is the in-
vestor.
Concern arises where the bank selling the participation fails. If
the participant owns its underlying interest in the loan, it will be re-
paid from payments that the borrower makes under the loan. If, how-
ever, the participant does not own that underlying interest, it merely
has a contract claim against the bank from which it bought the par-
ticipation, which will rank at best pari passu with claims of the bank’s
other creditors. The participant’s claim therefore will be impaired if
the bank is insolvent.63 In this Article’s terminology, the risk that the
selling bank’s failure will impair the participant’s claim is the inter-
mediary risk.
and other institutional investors, “has increased to the point where it has become a multi-billion
dollar business.” HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 157 (1999).
61. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater Than the Whole: How Securitization of
Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to
Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139, 151 n.41 (1993); see also Patrick J.
Ledwidge, Loan Participations Among Commercial Banks, 51 TENN. L. REV. 519, 521-22 (1984)
(observing that loan participations are used to disperse credit risk among banks). On the need
for diversification of loan credit risk, see W. Crews Lott et al., Structuring Multiple Lender
Transactions, 112 BANKING L.J. 734, 734 (1995) (observing that, during the past decade, the
“number, size, and complexity of multiple lender transactions have grown explosively as lenders
have shifted their focus [toward] more prudent risk diversification”). See also Memorandum
from William F. Kroener, III, General Counsel et al., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), to the FDIC’s Board of Directors 5 (July 26, 2000) (observing that “loan
participations remain an important method for insured banks and thrifts to diversify their credit
risks”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
62. The lending bank’s original credit exposure after making the loan is $2 million. It
reduces that exposure by $1.5 million by selling the three 25% participations in the loan:
$2,000,000 loan x three 25% undivided interests (i.e., 75% aggregate undivided interest) sold =
$1,500,000 aggregate purchase price of the participations. The lending bank thus has reduced its
$2 million exposure by $1.5 million, to $500,000.
63. Joseph J. Norton, International Syndicated Lending: The Legal Context for Economic
Development in Latin America, NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. AM., Summer 1996, at 21, 67
(“Participating banks can incur substantial problems if the lead lender becomes insolvent.”);
Robert O. Wienke, Loan Syndications and Participations: Trends and Tactics, COM. LENDING
REV., Spring 1994, at 4, 13-14 (same).
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Resolution of this intermediary risk can have real and significant
consequences. Participants want to know that if the selling bank fails,
their right to be repaid from payments that the borrower makes un-
der the loan will have priority over claims of the bank’s creditors.
Furthermore, the consequences are not only to these parties. If par-
ticipants do not have priority, the failure of a selling bank would im-
pair their repayment, in turn threatening them with failure and caus-
ing a chain reaction of failures to the extent the participants are then
unable to pay their obligations to third parties (including, in the case
of participant banks, their obligations to depositors).64 Again, there is
potential for systemic risk.
Status of loan participation intermediary risk. The issue of inter-
mediary risk for loan participations is unresolved even in the United
States, where loan participations are most common.65 In In re Yale
Express System, Inc.,66 for example, a bank made a loan to Yale Ex-
press and then sold a 40% participation therein to Marine Midland
Trust Company (“Marine”).67 In Yale Express’ subsequent bank-
ruptcy, the court held that the purchase of the participation made
64. There is much greater potential for systemic risk where the selling bank fails than
where the borrower on the loan fails because banks, as a matter of law and practice, ordinarily
diversify their lending risk to borrowers but do not always diversify their intermediary risk to
banks selling participations. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1995) (stating that a bank’s total loans to a
person “shall not exceed 10 per centum of [the bank’s] unimpaired capital”); Eunhangbop
[Banking Act], Act No. 5499 of 1998, arts. 35, 36, translated in 11 KOREA LEGIS. RES. INST.,
STATUTES OF THE REBUBLIC OF KOREA 64-66 (1997)(discussing lending limits imposed on
banks in Korea); 12 C.F.R. §§ 32.3, 32.5(f) (1991) (imposing lending limits on banks in the
United States); PHILIP N. HABLUTZEL, [1997] 2 INT’L BANKING L. (CBC) app. 21 F, at 89-90
(discussing in Section 13 the large-scale lending limits imposed on banks in Germany); id. ch. 26,
at 14-15 (§ 26:08 Regulation of Lending) (discussing lending limits imposed on banks in New
Zealand); id. ch. 10, at 28 (§ 10:16 Lending Regulation) (discussing lending limits imposed on
banks in Canada); id. app. 3, at 47 (No. 38 of the U.K. Banking Act of 1987) (discussing lending
limits imposed on banks in the United Kingdom); id. ch. 24, at 12 (§ 24:04 Commercial Banks)
(discussing lending limits imposed on banks in Japan). Thus, even though a participant’s
exposure to the credit risk of a particular borrower may be limited, the participant may have
purchased multiple participations (each for a different borrower) from the selling bank. If the
selling bank fails, the participant would be subject to intermediary risk with respect to the
aggregate amount of participations so purchased. The law could require such additional
diversification, but that would address the issue of intermediary risk only in the context of loan
participations.
65. For a discussion of the use of loan participations in international finance, see Norton,
supra note 63, at 28-31 (observing that “loan participations should continue to be important
financing vehicles”); David Z. Nirenberg, Note, International Loan Syndications: The Next
Security, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 155, 159 (1984) (stating that while syndicated loans are
more common in international finance, “[p]articipation loans are more popular domestically”).
66. 245 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
67. Id. at 791.
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Marine a creditor of the selling bank, not an owner of an interest in
the underlying loan.68 As a result, Marine would be subject to the
selling bank’s intermediary risk.69 Other cases, however, suggest an
opposite result. In FDIC v. Mademoiselle of California,70 for example,
a bank sold an 80% participation in one of its loans.71 After its subse-
quent insolvency and takeover by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the selling bank made a substantial recovery on the
loan.72 The participant then claimed ownership of 80% of that recov-
ery.73 The court reasoned that the participant would own, and there-
fore would be entitled to, that undivided interest but for the fact that
the recovery was obtained by way of setoff, which does not constitute
a payment made by the debtor.74
It nonetheless has been observed that
[m]any loan participants believe that [the] problems [of intermedi-
ary risk] can be avoided by specifically providing in the loan partici-
pation agreement that [the] participation arose as a result of [the]
“absolute sale” of the loan and that the lead holds the loan partici-
pants’ interest in the loan as trustee.75
It is, however, “questionable whether this alternative will be fully
recognized.”76 The continuing legal uncertainty is instead likely to en-
68. Id. at 792.
69. Some commentators have observed that “[t]he absence of privity underscores the U.S.
view that no legal assignment of contract rights or obligations occurs when a loan participation
is purchased.” Francis D. Logan et al., The Securitization of U.S. Bank Activities in the
Eurodollar Market—Issues for U.S. Counsel, 11 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 539, 545 n.19
(1986).
70. 379 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1967).
71. Id. at 661.
72. Id. at 662.
73. Id. at 664.
74. Id. at 665. Accord In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc., 113 B.R. 830, 842 n.15
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“In Mademoiselle, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged with approbation
the general rule that a loan participation passes legal title in the proceeds of the fund to the
participants.”).
75. Wienke, supra note 63, at 13.
76. Id. at 13-14 (citing case law in which the “court refused to hold that the participation
agreement constituted a trust relationship between the parties, even though the agreement
contained language that the lead ‘shall be a trustee for the benefit of and accountable’ to the
participant”). Therefore, Wienke concludes, “these problems [of intermediary risk] are likely to
persist.” Id. at 14; see also Robert S. Rendell, Current Issues in Participation and Other Co-
Lending Arrangements: An American Viewpoint, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS
AND PRACTICES: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 189, 207-08 (J.J. Norton et al. eds., 1994)
(concluding that “[d]espite a number of recent cases in this area, the law remains unsettled”
with respect to the legal consequences of the lead bank’s failure); cf. infra notes 88-97 and
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courage litigation by receivers for insolvent selling banks, which “will
often argue that participating banks are merely general unsecured
creditors of the lead lender, rather than owners of interests in the
loans themselves, thus allowing them to subordinate the interests of
participating banks.”77
C. Securitization of Receivables
In securitization transactions, an intermediary also may hold as-
sets in which it and investors share beneficial interests. Securitization
is “by far the most rapidly growing segment of the U.S. credit mar-
kets,”78 and its “use is rapidly expanding worldwide.”79 In a typical
transaction, a company, usually called the “originator,” transfers
rights to payment from income-producing assets such as accounts re-
ceivable, loans, or lease rentals (collectively, “receivables”)—or fre-
quently undivided interests in such rights80—to a special purpose ve-
hicle, or “SPV.” The SPV, in turn, issues securities to capital market
accompanying text (discussing the analogous problem of determining whether a transfer of an
undivided interest in receivables is a true sale).
77. Norton, supra note 63, at 67. Although Professor Norton refers to arguments advanced
by U.S. receivers, foreign receivers of selling banks are likely to make the same arguments if
intermediary risk is unresolved in their jurisdictions. Cf. Wienke, supra note 63, at 13 (observing
that “receivers of the insolvent lead have often argued that participants are merely general
creditors of the lead rather than owners of an interest in the loans themselves, thus allowing the
receivers to subordinate the interests of the participants”).
78. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1996).
79. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133,
133 (1994); see also Memorandum from William F. Kroener, III, et al., supra note 61, at 3
(noting that “asset-backed securitization has developed into one of the most significant funding
sources for American and international corporations”).
80. 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 3.09, at 3-52, 3-53 (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed.,
2d ed. Supp. 2000) (articulating the advantages of the undivided interest structure). The
rationale for selling undivided interests is that it maximizes the statistical diversification of the
receivables sold to the SPV and also permits the SPV to invest in newly arising receivables by
simple readjustment of the SPV’s fractional interest. Undivided interests are widely used, for
example, in collateralized loan obligation and bank credit card securitizations. Interview with
Henry Morriello, Partner, Structured Finance and Asset-Based Transactions Group, Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, in New York, N.Y. (May 8, 2000); see also 1
SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, supra, § 3.03[A], at 3-13 (noting that the advantage of
the undivided-interest structure when securitizing pools of medium term receivables “is that one
may avoid the transaction costs associated with numerous separate purchases”); id. at 3-14
(observing that “mortgage-backed securitizations are generally handled using the [undivided
interest] structure”); id. at 3-14, 3-16 (observing that securitization of credit card receivables also
generally uses the undivided interest structure); id. at 3-17 (observing that “[t]he most
practicable structure [for securitization of trade receivables] has been the purchase of an
undivided, fractional interest in a pool of receivables”).
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investors81 and uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay for the receiv-
ables. The investors, who are repaid from collections of the receiv-
ables, buy the securities based on their assessments of the value of the
receivables.82
Perhaps the most critical analysis in a securitization is whether
the SPV and its investors will continue to be repaid in the event of the
originator’s bankruptcy.83 If the SPV owns the receivables, the SPV
and its investors will continue to be repaid; if not, their right to be re-
paid will be suspended and subject to possible impairment.84 The SPV
will gain ownership of the receivables only if the transfer of those re-
ceivables from the originator to the SPV constitutes a sale under ap-
plicable bankruptcy law.85 Irrespective of the criteria governing this
sale analysis, however,86 there is concern that an SPV that purports to
purchase only an undivided interest in, as opposed to whole, receiv-
ables may be unable to gain an ownership interest in the underlying
receivables.87
The originator is therefore the intermediary, and the risk that the
originator’s failure will prevent the SPV and its investors from being
repaid from the receivables is the intermediary risk. Resolution of
this risk is important because capital market investors want to know
that their right to receive repayment from the receivables will not be
affected in the event of the originator’s bankruptcy.
81. The term “capital markets” refers to any market where debt, equity, or other securities
are or may be traded. Actual capital markets can be formal or informal. See JOHN DOWNES &
JORDAN GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 59 (5th ed. 1998)
(defining capital markets).
82. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1999); see also id. at 6 n.21 (citing basic sources on securitization).
83. Schwarcz, supra note 79, at 151.
84. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION 29-30 (2d. ed. 1993). Thus, in cases where the SPV owns the
receivables, the investment decisions often can be made without concern for the originator’s
financial condition. See Schwarcz, supra note 82, at 6.
85. Schwarcz, supra note 79, at 135.
86. For a discussion of those criteria, see SCHWARCZ, supra note 84, at 28-35.
87. Interview with Eric P. Marcus, Partner and Chair, Structured Finance and Asset-Based
Transactions Group, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, in New York, N.Y. (May 8,
2000) (noting that even rating agencies have this concern); see also 1 SECURITIZATION OF
FINANCIAL ASSETS, supra note 80, § 3.09, at 3-52 (observing that “[i]t is also possible to argue
that a court will more likely find a sale of a discrete group of receivables than a sale of an
undivided interest in a pool to be a true sale, though there is no obvious analytical reason that
this must be so”).
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Status of securitization intermediary risk. The law is unsettled as
to whether the transfer of an undivided interest in receivables can
constitute a sale of such interest.88 The confusion stems partly from
uncertainty about the ability to transfer such a partial interest, partly
from uncertainty about what criteria define a sale of intangibles.89
This Article focuses on the former.90
At least one case holds that the transfer of an undivided interest
in receivables can constitute a sale, thereby avoiding intermediary
risk. In Angeles Real Estate Co. v. Kerxton,91 a company assigned one-
half of the proceeds of a promissory note as payment for a prior
debt.92 In the company’s subsequent bankruptcy case, the assignee
sued for its half share of those proceeds.93 The court held for the as-
signee, reasoning that the partial assignment was sufficient to transfer
legal title.94 In contrast, however, the bankruptcy court in Fireside
Credit, Inc. v. Dubuque Bank & Trust Co.95 invalidated the transfer
for security of an undivided interest in a pool of promissory notes.96
88. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 150 (referring to the “unfounded perception that
the transfer of only a partial interest in a future payment stream . . . cannot be a true sale”). A
recent congressional bill, however, proposes a safe harbor in which transfers of receivables,
including interests therein, in securitization transactions will be deemed to constitute true sales
provided certain conditions are met. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. §
912 (2001).
89. See, e.g., Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking The Role of Recourse in the Sale of
Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159, 159-63 (1996) (analyzing the uncertainty surrounding the
criteria for a sale).
90. Accordingly, I ask whether a transfer that otherwise would constitute a sale of
intangibles should fail because only a partial interest is being transferred. For an analysis of
whether a transfer of intangibles generally should constitute a sale, see SCHWARCZ, supra note
84, at 31-35.
91. 737 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1984).
92. Id. at 418.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 419 (following the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 326(1) (1981),
which provides that an “assignment of a part of a right, whether the part is specified as a
fraction, as an amount, or otherwise, is operative as to that part to the same extent and in the
same manner as if the part had been a separate right”).
95. Fireside Credit, Inc. v. Dubuque Bank & Trust Co. (In re Fireside Credit, Inc.), Bankr.
No. 86-02357D, Adv. No. 87-0173D (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Sept. 4, 1987).
96. Id. at 10. Fireside Credit made loans secured by notes receivable equal to 200 percent
of the outstanding balance of the loans. Id. at 2. Thus, if the amount of its loans at any given
time is $X and the outstanding balance of the notes at that time is $Y, Fireside Credit then
would be secured by a 2X/Y fractional undivided security interest in the notes. See id. at 6
(computing that fractional undivided interest as “less than 15 percent”). This case is not directly
on point because it involves the transfer for security, not ownership, of an undivided interest; in
the author’s experience, however, the case has been viewed by leading bankruptcy attorneys as
evidencing the difficulty of generally transferring an undivided interest.
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Confusion therefore remains in domestic as well as international
securitization transactions.97 As a result, parties are incurring signifi-
cant, and arguably unnecessary, transaction costs.98
D. The Need for a Unified Approach to Intermediary Risk
The foregoing examination of transaction patterns shows that the
issue of intermediary risk is treated piecemeal, if at all. Although cer-
tain states may resolve it by statute in the context of a particular
transaction pattern,99 there is no attempt, even in those states, to ex-
amine intermediary risk in a larger context.
Yet, a unified approach to this problem not only is necessary to
avoid cost, inefficiency, and confusion, but also is appropriate because
the commonality of intermediary risk to each of these patterns re-
flects a relationship among them. If each such pattern were viewed
from outside of a black box, an observer would only see investors put-
ting in money at one end and companies100 (to which the investors
look for repayment) repaying the money at the other end:
97. For a discussion of these and other unresolved issues in international securitization, see
generally Symposium, International Issues in Cross-Border Securitization and Structured
Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 229 (1998).
98. See supra note 87 (noting that rating agency concerns drive the structuring of
securitization transactions). These same rating agency concerns discourage use of the divisible
interest structure for securitizations, which not only represents “a less cumbersome
transactional structure than that which is currently used” but also “promise[s] to expand the
capital markets to now-excluded middle-market companies” by reducing transaction costs.
Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 167.
99. For example, states may enact Article 8 of the UCC in the United States.
100. More technically, an observer would not see companies, but instead would see
investors’ claims against or future payment streams owing from these companies.
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Each transaction pattern is therefore effectively a form of financing in
which the money flows through an intermediary. More generally, any
form of financing in which money flows through an intermediary is
inherently subject to intermediary risk—that the intermediary will fail
and its creditors will attempt to seize the cash flow. To the extent,
therefore, that market innovation spurs new forms of financing
through intermediaries, a unified conceptual approach to regulating
intermediary risk also should apply to future transaction patterns.101
I next attempt to derive such a unified approach.
III.  DERIVING A UNIFIED CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO
INTERMEDIARY RISK
I begin the analysis of intermediary risk by examining the simple
case in which an intermediary holds assets in which it has no benefi-
cial rights. I then build on that examination by analyzing the more dif-
ficult case, associated with the transaction patterns and generic fi-
nancing pattern discussed above, in which an intermediary holds
assets in which it shares beneficial rights. These examinations reveal,
101. Future transaction patterns may even replace existing patterns. The Internet, for
example, ultimately may allow investors to opt out of using securities intermediaries. See, e.g.,
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Property, Credit, and Regulation Meet Information Technology:
Clearance and Settlement in the Securities Markets, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 155
(Summer 1992) (arguing that technology would permit investors to connect directly to issuers,
thereby avoiding intermediary risk).
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however, that there is no reliable precedent for the treatment of in-
termediary risk. I therefore next look to first principles, comparing
the consequences to an intermediary’s creditors and investors that
would result from the externalities of intermediary risk with the con-
sequences to those parties that would occur in the absence of that
risk. This analysis suggests that investors should be protected from in-
termediary risk. Finally, I analyze how international law can provide
that protection.
A. Intermediary Risk Where the Intermediary Has No Beneficial
Rights
In this case, the intermediary would hold assets in which it either
has rights other than beneficial rights, or has no rights at all. I analyze
these scenarios in turn.
The scenario where the intermediary holds assets in which it has
rights other than beneficial rights. The common law tradition has
evolved the concept of a trust to cover this scenario. A trust is “a fi-
duciary relationship with respect to property, arising as a result of a
manifestation of an intention to create that relationship and subject-
ing the person who holds title to the property [the trustee] to duties to
deal with it for the benefit of” third parties.102 The theory is that the
trustee holds “legal” title to the asset, whereas the third parties hold
“equitable” title.103 The significance of this distinction is that equitable
title gives beneficial rights in an asset whereas legal title does not—
the same distinction that I am attempting to analyze in this scenario.104
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS]. Some caution should be advanced, however, because the
Restatement of Trusts does not necessarily deal with commercial trusts. See id. § 1 cmt. b, § 5
cmt. l. Comment b explains that although many rules of trust law also apply to commercial
trusts, many do not; instead, “other rules are drawn from other bodies of law that are specially
applicable to those activities even when conducted in trust form.” Id. § 1 cmt. b.
103. Id., Reporter’s Notes on § 2 (observing that “there is probably general agreement in
the United States today that a trust involves a division of legal and equitable ownership”).
Historically, this distinction between legal interests (held by trustees) and equitable interests
(held by beneficiaries) is traceable to the separation of judicial functions in English courts of
common law and chancery. Id., Introductory Note.
104. See, e.g., Mont. Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 127-28 (1906)
(“The expression, beneficial use or beneficial ownership or interest, in property is quite
frequent in the law and means in this connection such a right to its enjoyment as exists where
legal title is in one person and the right to such beneficial use or interest is in another.”);
XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Group, Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443, 1449 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“A debtor that served prior to bankruptcy as trustee of an express trust generally has no right
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Whether or not this distinction is necessary for the creation of trust
law,105 I will use trust law, which reflects this distinction, as paradig-
matic of the scenario where an intermediary holds assets in which it
has rights other than beneficial rights.
It is reasonably well established in common law states that the
beneficiary of a trust is not subject to intermediary risk. If the inter-
mediary, i.e., the trustee, goes bankrupt, the beneficiary’s claim
against trust assets should not be subject to claims of the trustee’s
creditors because the beneficiary is deemed to have property rights in
those assets:
Our contention is that [the question whether a beneficiary has prop-
erty rights, instead of a mere chose in action,] should be answered in
the affirmative. The beneficiary of a trust has a property interest in
the subject matter of the trust. He has a form of ownership. He has
much more than a mere claim against the trustee, a mere chose in
action.106
This does not mean, however, that the issue was always seen as free
of doubt. “Scholars have long debated whether the beneficiary of a
trust has a property interest in the trust or merely a personal right
against the trustee.”107 This debate has its origin in the historical evo-
to the assets kept in trust, and the trustee in bankruptcy must fork them over to the
beneficiary.”).
105. The Restatement of Trusts itself acknowledges that this distinction “has not been one
of universal acceptance.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 102, Reporter’s Notes
on § 2. It states, for example, that “although the provisions of the Japanese Trust Law as a
whole closely parallel trust law principles set out in the Restatement, Second, of Trusts, trust
concepts in that country are based on and discussed in terms of obligation rather than legal and
equitable property rights.” Id.; see also Shintaku Ho [Trust Law], Law No. 62 of 1922, art. 1,
translated in EIBUN-HOREI-SHA, 6 EHS LAW BULLETIN SERIES JAPAN, at CD1 (1994) (“The
trust within the meaning of this Law shall signify to transfer or otherwise dispose of a property
right and cause another person to administer or dispose of the property in accordance with a
specific purpose.”).
106. 2 WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 130 (14th ed. 1987); see also Austin W.
Scott, Jr., The Importance of the Trust, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 177, 178 (1967) (“[I]t is generally
agreed in England as well as in the United States that the beneficiaries of a trust have a
proprietary interest in the subject matter of the trust and not merely a personal claim against the
trustee.”).
107. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. S.S. Westhampton, 358 F.2d 574, 584 (4th Cir. 1965)
(“The courts have had less trouble with this question. The Supreme Court has held that
beneficiaries of a trust have an interest in the property to which the trustee holds legal title.”);
see also GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1
(2d ed. 1984) (observing that “[w]hether the right which the beneficiary has is a property right in
the subject-matter of the trust (a right in rem), or merely a personal right against the trustee (a
right in personam), is a question much debated”); 5 PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL
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lution of trust law because “the chancellors at the beginning gave [the
beneficiary of a trust] no more than a claim against the trustee, and
only gradually gave him proprietary rights.”108 Thus, even though trust
law has evolved to the point where there is little doubt about the na-
ture of a beneficiary’s interest,109 there has been historical doubt.
It likewise appears to be the case in civil law states, notwith-
standing opinions to the contrary,110 that trust concepts exist and that
the beneficiary of a trust may not be subject to intermediary risk.111 At
least one noted civil law scholar even claims that “the trust belongs to
the civil law, whence it was imported in England during the formative
period of the Chancellor’s jurisdiction over trusts.”112 In his view, the
widespread belief that trusts are inconsistent with civil law reflects the
failure of common and civil law scholars to seriously address the basis
of trust law:
The mere fact that trusts exist in civil law countries should prove the
point that there is no basic incompatibility with civil law structures.
Why, then, is the opposite view held so unanimously? The simple
answer is that common law scholars have not attempted a compara-
tive study of the civil law institutions, while civil law scholars have
not attempted a comparative study of trusts.113
PROPERTY ¶514[1] (1999) (arguing that a beneficiary of a trust only has a limited cause of action
coupled with certain protective rights against third party interference).
108. FRATCHER, supra note 106, § 130; see also id. (noting that “[t]he growth of the trust has
been a process of evolution,” and even courts were slow in recognizing the proprietary interest
of the beneficiary as against third parties).
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, Reporter’s Notes on § 49 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1999) (stating that beneficiaries have a property interest in trust assets and not merely a
claim against the trustee, and noting that the United States Supreme Court and the House of
Lords in England have accepted the “principle that a beneficiary of a trust has a proprietary
interest in the subject matter of the trust”); see also E-mail from Joanna Benjamin, Senior
Lecturer, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, University of London, to Steven L. Schwarcz,
Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Oct. 15, 2000) (arguing that although some
conceptual confusion may remain, there is little doubt under English law that trust interests are
proprietary for the purposes of the insolvency of the trustee) (on file with Duke Law Journal).
110. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 102, Introductory Note
(observing that the trust is “peculiarly a product of the Anglo-American system”).
111. See Maurizio Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 967, 968 (1999)
(aruging that trusts are not incompatible with civil law systems). But cf. Henry Hansmann &
Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 456 (1998) (arguing that absent legislative changes to continental European
law, the beneficiary may be subject to intermediary risk).
112. Lupoi, supra note 111, at 969.
113. Id. at 976. Professor Lupoi indeed goes on to argue that
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According to this scholar, it is a “fundamental [civil law] rule that the
creditors of the trustee . . . cannot attack the assets bequeathed to him
[in trust].”114 Indeed, “[a]ll civil law systems have long known in-
stances in which assets owned by someone [e.g., a trustee] are not
available to his creditors because they are to be handed over to
someone else.”115
Civil law states also have been moving legislatively to resolve any
lingering doubt. For example, every European state has enacted leg-
islation shielding trust property from claims against mutual fund in-
termediaries and investment firm intermediaries that operate as port-
folio managers.116 Japan and Korea also have adopted trust laws that
eliminate intermediary risk.117
Hence, even under the civil law, the beneficiary of a trust should
not be subject to intermediary risk. Therefore, under both common
and civil law systems, if an intermediary holds assets in which it has
only nonbeneficial rights, those assets should be immune from claims
of the intermediary’s creditors, thereby eliminating intermediary risk.
The foregoing analysis indicates that this conclusion has not al-
ways been free of doubt, however. In common law states, there has
been historical uncertainty about the evolution of trust law; in civil
law states, there has been ambiguity about the very permissibility of
trust concepts. These doubts at least raise the question in the more
difficult case, where the intermediary and investors share beneficial
rights,118 whether the investors’ interests constitute property or merely
an in personam claim against the intermediary.
[civil law scholars] led astray by the unguarded language of common law scholars—
who should think twice before uttering the magic words “equitable ownership” in
front of civil law practitioners—claim that trusts subvert the framework of real rights,
or that the unity of patrimony becomes fragmented. Not one ounce of truth is found
in those pronouncements.
Id. at 977 (footnote omitted).
114. Id. at 975.
115. Id. at 978; see also id. at 979 (illustrating that assets held by an undisclosed agent for his
principal cannot be seized by the agent’s creditors even though “the agent purchased them in his
own name, and for all intents and purposes he is their sole owner”).
116. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 111, at 458-59; see also D.J. HAYTON ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TRUST LAW 11-20 (1999) (examining ways of incorporating the
common law trust into European law).
117. For Japan, see Shintaku Ho [Trust Law], Law No. 62 of 1922, art. 16, no. 1, translated in
EIBUN-HOREI-SHA, 6 EHS LAW BULLETIN SERIES JAPAN, at CD1 (1994). For Korea, see
Sintakbop [Trust Act], Act No. 900 of 1961, art. 22, translated in 3 KOREA LEGIS. RES. INST.,
STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 365 (1997).
118. See infra Part III.B (analyzing that situation).
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An economic analysis of trust law raises similar doubts. Scholars
have raised two rationales for limiting intermediary risk in the tradi-
tional trust context; neither applies, though, to the sharing by inter-
mediaries and investors of beneficial rights. The first rationale is that
trustees signal their lack of ownership of the trust property:
[S]imple accounting measures [such as using the words “in trust”
when registering or otherwise dealing with property] can easily sig-
nal to the [trustee’s] potential creditors which of the properties in
the [trustee’s] possession is held in trust and therefore is unavailable
to satisfy the creditors in case of the [trustee’s] insolvency.119
These creditors, in turn, can adjust their credit terms accordingly.120
Where the intermediary and investors share beneficial rights, how-
ever, the signaling mechanism breaks down.121
The second rationale for limiting intermediary risk in the tradi-
tional trust context is that “the law apparently presumes that the
[trustee’s] creditors are in a better position than the [beneficiary] to
look out for themselves.”122 Accordingly, even when the trustee negli-
gently or intentionally fails to signal,123 thereby misleading its credi-
tors, “the law of trusts nonetheless favors” the beneficiary.124 Al-
though this rationale is persuasive for gratuitous trusts where the
beneficiary is passive,125 it is less persuasive in the transactional con-
texts described in this Article where the transaction is a bargained-for
exchange and the investors are relatively sophisticated.126
119. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 111, at 455.
120. Id.
121. Indeed, the signaling rationale implicitly assumes that the trustee segregates and does
not commingle trust property with its own property. See also Lupoi, supra note 111, at 970
(defining a trust in comparative law terms to require “the lack of commingling between [the
property transferred to the trustee or declared to be so transferred] and other elements of the
trustee’s estate (segregation)”). It is, however, impossible to segregate assets and prevent
commingling when the intermediary shares undivided interests in the same assets.
122. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 111, at 455 (observing that in “Calabresian
terminology, [the creditors] are the cheapest cost avoiders”).
123. For example, by failing to use the words “in trust” in dealings with trust property.
124. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 111, at 455.
125. See id. (considering “the classic situation” in which the beneficiary is incompetent or a
child).
126. But cf. infra note 129 and accompanying text discussing how, under agency law, an
intermediary’s creditors cannot attach assets that the intermediary is merely holding as an agent
for an undisclosed principal. The rationale for this rule cannot be signaling, and the rationale
that the agent’s creditors are in a better position than the principal to look out for themselves is
likewise problematic.
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The scenario where the intermediary holds assets in which it has
no rights. It is well established that there is no intermediary risk when
an intermediary holds assets in which it has no rights. Thus, it is “the
general rule that a bailor may reclaim property it entrusts to a bailee
who subsequently files for bankruptcy”127 and that a trustee in bank-
ruptcy cannot bring property merely held by the debtor into the
debtor’s bankruptcy estate.128 Likewise, an intermediary’s creditors
cannot attach assets that the intermediary is merely holding as an
agent for an undisclosed principal, even though the intermediary ap-
pears to own such assets.129
This result is not surprising. A creditor only should be able to
seize assets to the extent of its debtor’s rights therein.130 The absence
of intermediary risk is also consistent with the prior scenario: if an in-
termediary has no rights in assets that it holds, its creditors should
have even less of a basis to seize those assets than if the intermediary
had rights therein. Examination of this second scenario therefore
does not appear to yield additional insight.131
127. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Harrison, 639 F.2d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 1981).
128.  See, e.g., In re Clemens, 472 F.2d 939, 942 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that a bankrupt son’s
estate had no claim to one-half of his mother’s property where the court determined that he
merely held the property interest in trust); Sonnenschien v. Reliance Ins. Co., 353 F.2d 935, 935
(2d Cir. 1965) (holding that where trust funds “cannot be sufficiently identified or traced in a
bankruptcy proceeding,” the trust beneficiary must proceed as a general creditor); City of
Dallas v. Crippen, 171 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1948) (holding that creditors of bankrupt have no
claim to traceable trust property); Glynn Wholesale Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Skelton, No. 276-96,
1978 WL 1229, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 12, 1978) (concluding that “[t]he beneficiary of a valid pre-
existing trust may enforce his interest in the trust property in the possession of a trustee in
bankruptcy”).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 420 (1958); Lupoi, supra note 111, at 978-79.
A related issue is whether the commingling by third parties of their assets affects, in and of
itself, such parties’ property rights. It has been observed, for example, that “[a]ccording to
traditional principles which applied under both common law and civil law legal systems, and
whose origins are rooted in Roman law,” the commingling of fungible property terminates
direct property rights of persons owning such property. BERNASCONI, supra note 44, at 19
(emphasis in original). Even if this principle continues in some jurisdictions, however, its
“consequences will depend on the precise terms on which [the] deposits are made.” Id. Thus,
depositors can retain “some form of common or co-proprietary interest with other depositors in
the commingled bulk.” Id. This retention would eliminate intermediary risk to the extent such
proprietary interest protects the deposits from claims of creditors of a failed intermediary. Nor
does the aforesaid commingling principle yield any normative insight into the question of
intermediary risk.
130. Cf. infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing this proposition as a corollary of
the principle of nemo dat quod non habet).
131. It should be noted that the difference between these scenarios—in which the
intermediary has no rights or only nonbeneficial rights—is sometimes blurred. This can be
illustrated by Professor Lupoi’s analysis of the confusion the Hague Convention of 1984 caused.
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B. Intermediary Risk Where the Intermediary Shares Beneficial
Rights
The foregoing analysis has not yielded any significant insight into
this more difficult case associated with the transaction patterns and
generic financing pattern discussed in Part II of this Article. Indeed,
there is no reliable precedent for the treatment of intermediary risk
where the intermediary and investors share beneficial rights. The ob-
vious precedent, Article 8 of the UCC, may have been influenced by
interest group politics,132 and the justifications given for its treatment
of intermediary risk appear more practical than principled.133 Al-
though certain other legal fields such as joint tenancies in real estate
and community property law arguably might provide precedents (a
joint homeowner occupying a house, or a spouse in possession of and
using community property, being analogized to an intermediary),
these fields of law evolved in settings involving natural persons, often
See Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, July 1, 1985,
reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS app. 51 (John Glasson ed., 1999). Professor Lupoi
asserts that “[t]he Hague Convention of 1984 did its best, with considerable success, to further
confuse the issues.” Lupoi, supra note 111, at 979. That Convention defines a trust as “the legal
relationships created . . . by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the
control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose.” Convention on
the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, supra, art. 2. The phrase “under the
control” is ambiguous, however, because it “does not necessarily imply a transfer of title.”
Lupoi, supra note 111, at 979. A trust therefore could “exist even if the settlor is still regarded as
the owner of what a common [law] lawyer would call ‘trust assets.’” Id. at 979-80. This confusion
may be compounded by the different translations of the Hague Convention; for example, the
French text of Article 2 of the Hague Convention, providing that creditors of the trustee may
not seize the trust assets, excludes the assets in trust from the trustee’s estate by referring to a
separate trust estate, whereas the English text, according to Lupoi, includes those assets but
clarifies that they do not belong to the “trustee’s own estate.” Id. at 980. Thus, Lupoi observes,
“a new trust concept was born at The Hague—the ‘Convention trust’ or ‘shapeless trust.’” Id. at
980 (citing The Shapeless Trust, 1 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 15 (1995)). For example, an
arrangement in which a manager manages funds for others would be a Convention trust, and the
manager’s creditors could not seize the managed funds. Id. However, “no common law
jurisdiction would regard such an arrangement as a trust.” Id. For purposes of this Article,
however, this blurring of the scenarios should be irrelevant for the same reason stated above in
the text: the scenario in which the intermediary holds assets in which it has no rights offers no
additional insight beyond that gained from the scenario in which the intermediary has only
nonbeneficial rights.
132. See generally Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform
State Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83
(1993) (exploring impact of interest groups on uniform laws process).
133. That appearance may well reflect reality because the goal of Article 8 was to catch up
to already established industry practices. See Rogers, supra note 30, at 287 (arguing that
“[Revised Article 8] does not so much change the law as recognize the changes that have
already occurred”).
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family members; thus, they are not necessarily good precedents for
analyzing intermediary risk in commercial settings. My analysis there-
fore starts from first principles.
It is a fundamental axiom that a creditor qua creditor cannot
validly claim more rights than its debtor has in property.134 This is a
corollary of the universally recognized principle of nemo dat quod
non habet, or one who has not cannot give.135 If, therefore, a debtor
owns only a partial interest in a given item of property, its creditors in
their capacity as such should be able to reach only that partial inter-
est.136 If this axiom holds true, it is plain that a creditor of an interme-
diary should be able to reach only the intermediary’s undivided inter-
est.
This axiom clearly should hold true in the context of undivided
interests. Commercial law generally respects nemo dat (and by exten-
sion the axiom)137 with only limited exceptions: that bona fide pur-
chasers of goods and holders in due course of negotiable instruments
are not necessarily subject to defenses and encumbrances to which
the transferor is subject.138 The rationale for these exceptions—that
134. See, e.g., In re Kinsler, 24 B.R. 962, 967 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (“The Debtor’s
creditors could not get more than that to which the Debtor is entitled.”); IAN F. FLETCHER,
INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 61-62 (1999):
[I]t is one of the fundamental principles of English bankruptcy law that the trustee in
bankruptcy takes the bankrupt’s property “subject to equities,” in the sense that any
imperfections in that title, and any valid and subsisting claims arising from the
property or any security rights previously effected in relation to it, are transmitted
intact so as to be exercisable against the trustee as the new owner.
The rationale is that “the trustee is essentially a successor to such title as the bankrupt
actually had at the time of his adjudication, including any limitations or imperfections in that
title, and can enjoy no better position in relation to the property than did the bankrupt himself
formerly.” IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY 205 (2d ed. 1996) (emphasis in
original).
135. The phrase dates back at least to Justinian’s Digest, which credits the Roman jurist
Ulpian with the phrase “nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet” (no one
can transfer more legal rights than he himself has). Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside
Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 333 (1999)
(citing 11 THE CIVIL LAW 302 (S.P. Scott trans., 1932)); see also G. GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 229 n.1 (1965) (providing a more detailed history of the
nemo dat principle); Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Financing:
UNCITRAL’s Contribution, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 315, 319 (1998) (noting recognition of
this principle in civil law states).
136. That is, the creditors only should be able to satisfy their claims from that partial
interest.
137. See, e.g., JOHN F. DOLAN & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, BASIC CONCEPTS IN
COMMERCIAL LAW 6 (1998) (arguing that the concept that transferees can enjoy greater rights
than their transferors enjoyed “is an idea that offends clear thinkers”).
138. See U.C.C. §§ 2-403, 3-305, 9-307 (1977).
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the importance of free-market transferability should override nemo
dat in these situations139—has been questioned, however:
Over the past thirty years there has been debate about the impor-
tance of the holder in due course doctrine in facilitating these trans-
actions. . . . It now appears that the [arguments that holder in due
course is unimportant for facilitating the flow of credit and goods]
were correct.140
Nor would the rationale of these commercial law exceptions—en-
couraging transferability—apply to the transaction patterns of this
Article. Quite the contrary, any exceptions to the axiom would in-
crease intermediary risk, thereby discouraging the transferability of
undivided interests.141
Furthermore, there are no other compelling arguments for over-
riding the axiom in the context of these transaction patterns. The
strongest such argument is that, if the axiom is respected, creditors of
an intermediary may be misled into thinking that the intermediary
owns all rights in the asset that it holds.142 I later show, however, that
this argument should not justify giving those creditors more rights
than the intermediary.143
Even bankruptcy law—including the United States Bankruptcy
Code,144 which is strongly biased in favor of maximizing “debtor assets
139. See, e.g, Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE
L.J. 1057, 1057 (1954) (arguing that the good faith purchaser “is protected not because of his
praiseworthy character, but to the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in without
elaborate investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession of property by one
who offers it for sale or to secure a loan”).
140. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 508 (citations omitted) (extrapolating from the
abolition of the holder in due course doctrine in consumer credit transactions, which “caused
barely a ripple on the consumer credit pond”).
141. In the context of the indirect holding system, however, an exception to the axiom
would facilitate the transfer of security interests in the United States. I later show this exception
may be unjustified absent a regulatory scheme, such as exists in the United States, protecting
investors from its consequences. See infra notes 238-50 and accompanying text.
142. See infra note 167 and accompanying text (raising this argument in the context of
identifying contract externalities). Perhaps this concern over misleading creditors also helps to
explain the law’s historical uneasiness about commingling. See supra note 129 (discussing
traditional legal principles under which the commingling of fungible property terminates
“direct” property rights of persons owning such property).
143. See infra notes 170-205 and accompanying text (analyzing whether to enforce contracts
that purport to transfer undivided interests).
144. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1994) (hereinafter the “Bankruptcy Code”). The following
discussion of the Bankruptcy Code is intended to be illustrative only. Because this Article
addresses international transaction patterns, the application of any particular nation’s
bankruptcy or insolvency laws is necessarily incomplete, no matter which laws are chosen.
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for the benefit of unsecured creditors”145 and therefore, as shown be-
low, ostensibly inconsistent with the axiom—would appear to respect
the axiom. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the
bankruptcy estate available for the payment of unsecured creditors
includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property.”146
Courts have interpreted this language still more broadly to include
property in which the debtor merely has an interest.147 This raises the
possibility that a debtor-intermediary’s undivided interest in an item
of property, because it represents a fractional interest in the entire
item, might permit a trustee in bankruptcy to incorporate the entire
item and not just the debtor-intermediary’s fractional interest therein
into the bankruptcy estate.
Nevertheless, a review of cases and other authorities interpreting
the Bankruptcy Code suggests, for two reasons, that only the debtor-
intermediary’s fractional undivided interest, and not the undivided in-
terests of third parties, should be included in the bankruptcy estate.
First, courts have found that a debtor’s “minor” interest in an item of
property is insufficient to bring that property into the debtor’s bank-
ruptcy estate.148 It is clear, for example, that a debtor’s legal title to an
asset is an insufficient interest where the beneficial interest in the as-
set is owned by third parties.149 In the case of an undivided interest,
the fact that the debtor’s fraction is applied against the entire asset is
simply an arithmetic technicality and thus arguably minor.150
Moreover, even in the United States, many intermediaries in the indirect holding system for
securities (one of the three transaction patterns discussed in this Article) are banks which are
not subject to the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 109(b), (d). But cf. JACKSON & SYMONS, supra note
60, at 387 (noting that bankruptcy law can sometimes even be applied to a bank’s insolvency by
analogy); Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 469,
505 (1992) (arguing against the need for special bank insolvency rules, in part because some of
these rules may be based more on politics than public policy).
145. David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1055, 1055 (1998).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 n.8 (1983) (clarifying
that although “Section 541(a)(1) speaks in terms of the debtor’s ‘interests . . . in property,’
rather than property in which the debtor has an interest, . . . this choice of language was not
meant to limit the expansive scope of the section”).
148. Id. (excluding “minor interest[s] such as a lien or bare legal title”).
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1994) (providing that “[p]roperty in which the debtor holds . . .
only legal title and not an equitable interest . . . becomes property of the estate . . . only to the
extent of the debtor’s legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest
in such property that the debtor does not hold”).
150. See Carlson, supra note 145, at 1069-70:
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The second, more substantial, reason turns on policy. In arguing
that a debtor’s contingent right to surplus from an under-secured bor-
rowing should be sufficient to bring all the collateral into its bank-
ruptcy estate, Professor Carlson has asked what “principle . . . distin-
guishes beneficiaries of trusts from secured creditors.”151 The
distinction, he concludes,
has to do with appreciation value. When a creditor claims any sort of
lien on property that goes up in value, the creditor’s immediate liq-
uidation of such property effectively deprives the debtor, and her
unsecured creditors, of any potential upside. . . . In comparison, the
beneficial owners of trust property are not subject to bankruptcy ju-
risdiction because they, not the debtor, own the cozening hope of
appreciation value. If trust property goes up in value, the fiduciary
does not keep the surplus but rather the beneficiary enjoys the in-
crease. This aspect of equitable property interests keeps it outside of
bankruptcy jurisdiction.152
Professor Carlson maintains that “[t]his distinction captures the
spirit of the Bankruptcy Code’s legislative history.”153 Moreover, this
distinction is consistent with the only provision of the Bankruptcy
Code that explicitly addresses undivided interests. Section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code permits the trustee in bankruptcy to sell both the
debtor’s interest “and the interest of any co-owner in property in
which the debtor [has] an undivided interest as a tenant in common,
joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety.”154 Nevertheless, any such sale
is subject to conditions that protect the co-owners,155 and the trustee
in bankruptcy is required to “distribute to the . . . co-owners of such
Now, if the debtor and the beneficiary of a trust are, roughly speaking, cotenants of
the res of the trust, why can the debtor’s bankruptcy trustee not use this trust
property in speculative ventures for the benefit of the general creditors of the
debtor? . . . Such a thought is monstrous, and so, in default of a good answer, it is
usually asserted that the equitable part of the res is simply dehors the estate and
cannot be used beneficially for the unsecured creditors.
151. Id. at 1071.
152. Id. at 1071-72 (citations omitted) (identifying this distinguishing principle from Judge
Stephen Gerling’s decision in In re Amodio, 155 B.R. 622, 625 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993)).
153. Id. at 1072.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (1995) (emphasis added).
155. One condition, for example, is that “partition in kind of such property among the estate
and such co-owners is impracticable.” Id. § 363(h)(1). This condition may well be met where the
undivided interest is in a house or similar real estate but is unlikely to be met in the commercial
context of this Article, where the property is securities or cash. Another condition, which
contemplates the potential for appreciation, is that the sale would realize significantly more than
the sale of the partial interest. Id. § 363(h)(2).
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property . . . the proceeds of such sale . . . according to the interests of
such . . . co-owners.”156 Thus, after such sale and distribution of pro-
ceeds, the co-owners will not keep the full surplus appreciation value,
but they will keep their fractional interest in the surplus.
This distinction based on appreciation value likewise supports
the axiom’s application to undivided interests owned by an interme-
diary and investors. If the underlying property goes up in value, the
investors do not keep the entire surplus, but rather their fractional in-
terests therein; likewise, the intermediary will enjoy its fractional in-
terest of the surplus. Accordingly, the investors’ fractional interests
should remain outside bankruptcy jurisdiction.157
In summary then, the foregoing axiom—that if a debtor only
owns a partial interest in a given item of property, its creditors in their
capacity as such should be able to reach only that partial interest—
appears to hold true in the context of the transaction patterns of this
Article. Hence, a creditor of an intermediary should be able to reach
only the intermediary’s undivided interest.
This axiom might appear to, but does not, resolve the problem of
intermediary risk. That is because the difficult problem in analyzing
intermediary risk is even more fundamental than the axiom: defining
what rights the debtor should have in the property. I do not assume—
nor should one assume—that contracts that purport to allocate partial
156. Id. § 363(j). One could argue that the applicable provision of § 363 should be § 363(a),
which governs “cash, . . . securities, . . . or other cash equivalents . . . in which the estate and an
entity other than the estate have an interest.” Id. § 363(a) (collectively defining these cash
equivalents as “cash collateral”). This appears to include the securities, loans, and receivables
that are the subject of the transactions discussed in this Article. Even so, however, the co-
owners of cash collateral are protected. Section 363(c)(2) specifically restricts the trustee in
bankruptcy from using cash collateral unless the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes
such sale, and § 363(e) then requires the court to “prohibit or condition such use . . . as is
necessary to provide adequate protection of [the co-owners’] interest.” Id. §§ 363(c)(2), 363(e).
Furthermore, to the extent the undivided interest in cash collateral constitutes a tenancy in
common under applicable law, “§ 363(j) explicitly would require the cash collections of the
[property subject to the undivided] interest to be distributed to the [debtor-intermediary and
investor-co-owners] according to their respective interests.” Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 163.
The application of § 363(a) therefore would not change the underlying point of my analysis.
157. Specific laws to the contrary nonetheless could modify this general result. See U.C.C.
§ 8-503 cmt. 1 (2000) (noting, for example, that special “distributional rules for stockbroker
liquidation proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code and Securities Investor Protection Act
(‘SIPA’) provide that all customer property is distributed pro rata among all customers in
proportion to the dollar value of their total positions, rather than dividing the property on an
issue by issue basis”).
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rights between intermediaries and investors should be enforced.158
Contracts are not universally enforced, notwithstanding the banner of
freedom of contract. The presumption of contract enforceability is
rebuttable where the contract violates law, harms the contracting par-
ties (paternalism), or materially impinges on the rights of third parties
(material externalities).159 Hence, a contract that purports to allocate
partial property rights between an intermediary and investors might
be unenforceable if it violates law, causes such harm, or materially
impinges on third-party rights. If unenforceable, the contract would
be ineffective to allocate these partial property rights. That, in turn,
would expose the property to claims of the intermediary’s creditors,
creating intermediary risk. The issue of intermediary risk thus con-
ceptually turns on whether contracts that allocate partial property
rights between intermediaries and investors should, for one of the
foregoing reasons, be unenforceable.160
There is little reason to think that such contracts should violate
law, and I will therefore assume, for purposes of this Article, that they
do not. Paternalistic concerns are expressed in contract law defenses
based on unconscionability and can be observed in defenses based on
duress or information asymmetry.161 Information asymmetry means, in
the context of this Article, that the intermediary has significantly
greater information than the investor about the contractual relation-
ship between them, or vice versa. That appears unlikely in most cases
because intermediaries (depositories, clearinghouses,162 and brokers
158. I introduce contract law here because “the law of contracts [is] concerned with
facilitating the voluntary movement of property rights into the hands of those who value them
the most.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 35 (5th ed. 1998).
159. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy
Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 545-46 (1999) (discussing, in the context of bankruptcy, whether
contract law should place additional restrictions on one’s freedom to contractually override
statutory provisions); cf. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
58, 147 (1993) (discussing public policy limitations on freedom of contract).
160. Thus, the more interesting issue is not whether an investor’s undivided interest should
generally be subject to claims of an intermediary’s creditors—it should not—but whether
contracts that purport to divide pro rata interests between investors and intermediaries should
be enforced in the first place.
161. Schwarcz, supra note 159, at 546. Information asymmetry, for example, is not actually a
contract defense. An information asymmetry, however, may undermine some prerequisite to
enforceability—for example, by casting doubt on whether there is meaningful consent. Id. at 547
n.185.
162. The difference between clearinghouses and depositories to some extent parallels the
distinction between securities clearance and settlement. Documenting the transfer of ownership
of securities, including the identity and quantity of the securities being transferred, the price
payable therefor, the date of transfer, and the identity of the relevant investors, is referred to as
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holding interests in securities; banks selling loan participations; or
companies originating receivables for securitization transactions) as
well as investors (mostly institutional investors or brokers investing in
interests in securities, banks or other institutions buying loan partici-
pations from the selling bank, or capital market investors in securiti-
zations) are generally sophisticated commercial entities.163 Although
individual investors sometimes will be unsophisticated, my analysis
will focus on investors that are either sophisticated or repeat players
in the transaction patterns contemplated by this Article. Duress is
unlikely because, in the transaction patterns contemplated by this Ar-
ticle, the relationships between intermediaries and investors are en-
tirely free and voluntary.164 Unconscionability, which is based on the
premise that there may be certain extreme situations where as a mat-
ter of equity a contracting party must be protected against its own
weakness,165 is equally unlikely where the contracting parties are so-
“clearing.” SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 21, at 802. Transferring and paying for those
securities is referred to as “settlement.” Id. A clearinghouse generally keeps track of the
clearance process and a depository generally effectuates the settlement. Id. at 802, 804, 823. The
functions of clearinghouses and depositories may overlap, however. Where “clearinghouses do
not exist (e.g., in some European markets), depositories may take on functions of
clearinghouses,” and vice versa. Id. at 802 (quoting OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note
33, at ch. 5).
163. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, THIRD QUARTER 1999, 44, 89 (Dec. 15,
1999) [hereinafter FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS] (showing that, in 1998, net purchases of bonds
by the “household sector” were only 14.2% of similar purchases by institutional investors
(banks, insurance companies, and various funds) and, as of year-end 1998, household sector
bond outstandings were only 18.2% of institutional investor bond outstandings). This rise of
institutional investing appears to be a worldwide phenomenon, partly resulting from the shift
from traditional savings vehicles to more performance-oriented vehicles such as money-market
and mutual funds. See Hans J. Blommestein & Norbert Funke, The Rise of the Institutional
Investor, OECD OBSERVER, June-July 1998, at 37, 38 (observing that “[i]nstitutional
investors . . . have been gaining in importance in both OECD and non-OECD countries,” and
explaining the reasons for the trend).
164. Economic duress that merely arises out of hard bargaining is not a defense. See
Schwarcz, supra note 159, at 550.
165. Id. at 548; see, e.g., Doctor, Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 980 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The ‘purpose
of unconscionability doctrine is to prevent unfair surprise or oppression.’” (quoting David L.
Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991), in turn quoting
Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984))). Courts have used
the doctrine primarily to rescue from hard bargains those who are grossly disadvantaged in their
dealings with more sophisticated parties. Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between
Merchants, 40 SW. L.J. 1065, 1066 (1986). It therefore is questionable whether the doctrine
should apply to contracts between sophisticated parties. See Schwarcz, supra note 159, at 549-51
(arguing that unconscionability is rare in commercial settings because it not only requires a
finding of unequal bargaining power or unfair surprise but also of overly harsh or one-sided
contract terms or unreasonable and unexpected allocations of risk).
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phisticated or repeat players. Thus, in the context of this Article, pa-
ternalistic concerns are unlikely to interfere with the enforceability of
contracts allocating beneficial rights between investors and interme-
diaries.
Accordingly, the contractual allocation of rights between an in-
termediary and investors should be enforceable absent the creation of
material externalities. In our case, this allocation is effectuated pursu-
ant to contracts in which intermediaries purport to sell undivided in-
terests in their assets to investors. The potential externality is that a
person extending credit to an intermediary may be misled into think-
ing that the intermediary owns all rights in the asset that it holds.166
This externality is material because it goes to the very essence of the
intermediary’s ability to repay its creditors.167
Although this externality can be mitigated and made non-
material by disclosing the lack of ownership to potential creditors,
disclosure would be ineffective against existing or involuntary credi-
tors.168 These creditors therefore will be unable to engage in an in-
formed allocation of risk and the externality will remain. The law
therefore must address the extent to which contracts in which inter-
mediaries purport to sell undivided interests in their assets to inves-
tors, thereby producing this material externality, should be en-
forced.169
If these contracts are enforced, the investors would own the as-
sets held by the intermediary to the extent of their undivided interests
therein, and the intermediary would have no rights in the investors’
166. This is the same type of externality that led to the invalidation of contracts creating
undisclosed, or “secret,” liens. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.01, at 544-43 (Lawrence
P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996) (explaining that § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, and its predecessor
section under federal bankruptcy law, are designed to “strike down secret liens”); see also
PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 36 (1995) (arguing that
traditional civil law objections to the trust may be based on a concern that trusts are unfair to
creditors of the legal owner, who believe they can claim against all assets that the legal owner
appears to own).
167. Creditors normally have the right to be repaid only from property of the debtor’s
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1994).
168. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 159, at 532 n.93, 575 n.328 (acknowledging that even the
UCC filing system has this defect).
169. One might argue that disclosure under the Uniform Commercial Code has this same
defect. Yet security agreements are enforced notwithstanding such defective disclosure; thus,
disclosure subject to this defect should nonetheless be sufficient to ameliorate externalities. The
fallacy of such an argument, however, is that the existence of positive law cannot resolve a
normative law debate. See, e.g., id. at 575 (arguing that the existence of a positive law rule is
merely precedent for, and cannot be used to prove the validity of, a normative result).
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interests in those assets. The investors then would have priority over
claims of the intermediary’s creditors in accordance with the afore-
said axiom that a creditor qua creditor cannot validly claim more
rights than its debtor has in property.170 But if these contracts are not
enforced, the investors would only be left with in personam claims
against the intermediary,171 which would be pari passu with other un-
secured claims172 and effectively subordinate in priority to secured
claims.173
To determine which path the law should take, I attempt to com-
pare the consequences of enforcement with those of non-
enforcement. Comparison is appropriate because I do not focus on
whether the indirect holding system, or loan participations, or securi-
tization transactions justify their externalities. I assume they do. (If I
were to assume otherwise, my analysis would have to take into ac-
count the externalities that would be caused by prohibiting each
transaction pattern,174 such as, in the case of the indirect holding sys-
tem, the increased costs and complexities of record-keeping and in-
creased risk of loss occasioned by physically transferring securities.175)
My analysis merely focuses on which parties—an intermediary’s
creditors or its investors—should bear the externalities.176
170. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
171. Although it is possible to deny an investor even in personam claims, that result appears
unnecessarily harsh. Rather than mitigating the externality to creditors, it creates an externality
to investors. I therefore do not see it as a realistic option.
172. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (1994) (providing that unsecured claims generally are pari
passu in bankruptcy).
173. To the extent of collateral covered by the security interest, a secured claim against a
debtor has priority over unsecured claims, including unsecured claims that arise out of contract.
U.C.C. § 9-201 (2000).
174. In order to analyze whether a proposed system justifies its externalities, an analysis
would have to take into account the externalities that would arise in the presence, and absence,
of that system. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 480-84 (1997) (analyzing whether secured financing justifies its
externalities); Schwarcz, supra note 159, at 560-76 (analyzing whether pre-bankruptcy
contracting justifies its externalities).
175. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (maintaining that the indirect holding
system reduces these costs and lowers that risk). But cf. Letter from Kenneth C. Kettering,
Partner, Reed Smith Shaw & McClay LLP, to Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke
University School of Law 5-6 (June 21, 2000) (arguing that these costs and risks may be able to
be minimized in states that have widespread use of personal computers and a satisfactory legal
regime for issuing uncertificated securities) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
176. This approach is a variant of the traditional law and economics approach of allocating
risk to the lower-cost risk bearer and monitor. See, e.g., JEFFERY L. HARRISON, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 94 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining the traditional law and economics approach of
allocating risk to the lower-cost risk bearer and monitor). The first part of the variation—
comparing consequences, instead of merely comparing which parties (the intermediary’s
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Because comparing the consequences of enforcement and non-
enforcement may be influenced by the transactional context, I make
the comparison in the context of each transaction pattern.177 In the
context of an indirect securities holding system, the enforcement of
contracts in which intermediaries purport to sell undivided interests
in their assets to investors would give investors priority over claims of
the intermediary’s creditors.178 This might appear to discourage finan-
ciers from extending credit to intermediaries to enable them to en-
gage in margin lending179—the on-lending of such credit to investors
to enable them, in turn, to purchase securities.180 Whether margin
lending would be discouraged, however, is doubtful: intermediaries
typically require investors to pledge the purchased securities as col-
lateral for their margin loans,181 and financiers concerned about the
credit of their borrowers will require the intermediaries to re-pledge
these securities as collateral for the original credit.182 This re-pledge
ring consequences, instead of merely comparing which parties (the intermediary’s investors or
creditors) are the lower-cost risk bearers—is needed because the consequences of enforcing or
not enforcing contracts that purport to transfer undivided interests affect more than those
parties. See infra notes 178-204 and accompanying text (discussing the larger societal
consequences of contract enforcement in the context of undivided interest transfers). The
second part of the variation—disregarding which parties are the lower-cost monitors—is merely
a deferral of that analysis for the sake of clarity. I later show that the same parties who are the
lower-cost risk bearers are also the lower-cost monitors. See infra notes 205-11 and
accompanying text (showing that an intermediary’s creditors are both lower-cost risk bearers
and monitors). That the lower-cost risk bearers and monitors are the same parties makes the
analysis of risk allocation relatively simple by avoiding the need to discount the consequences of
the risk by the probability of the risk occurring (“risk” being a function of both the probability
of the risk-event occurring—the term “monitoring” merely being shorthand for trying to
prevent the risk-event—and the amount of loss that will result if the risk-event in fact occurs).
177. In comparing these consequences, I regard as interchangeable persons who may act as
an intermediary’s creditors and investors. To this extent, my approach is related to the Kaldor-
Hicks standard of economic efficiency under which a transaction is efficient if, with respect to all
parties affected thereby, the aggregate benefit exceeds the aggregate harm. See POSNER, supra
note 158, at 14-15 (describing the Kaldor-Hicks standard). The inherent rationale is that parties
who are injured in one transaction may be benefited in another, and therefore are
interchangeable when viewed from a statistical perspective. See Schwarcz, supra note 159, at 562
n.262 (noting this justification for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
178. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
179. At the end of the third quarter of 1999, the total liability of security brokers and dealers
on security credit from banks, for example, amounted to $122.1 billion. See FLOW OF FUNDS
ACCOUNTS, supra note 163, at 81.
180. DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REGULATION, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL § 3230.0.2.1, at 2 (June
1998).
181. Id.
182. Kenneth C. Kettering, Repledge Deconstructed, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 45, 51 (1999).
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effectively provides those financiers with priority over competing in-
vestor claims.183
In some states, it might be desirable to give even broader priority
to claims of the intermediary’s creditors over ownership interests of
investors. As a practical matter, such priority could be achieved by
statutorily subordinating investor ownership to such claims.184 Be-
cause that could discourage investment, however, a state might not
wish to impose subordination without compensating impaired inves-
tors, such as through regulatory protection of their interests.185
Non-enforcement, on the other hand, would leave investors with
mere in personam claims against intermediaries, which would be pari
passu with other unsecured claims and effectively subordinate in pri-
ority to secured claims.186 The consequence then may be to discourage
investors from dealing with any but the financially strongest interme-
diaries.187 Moreover, even if an investor were to attempt to protect it-
self by dealing with a financially strong intermediary (such as a large
and established brokerage house), it could not easily control the se-
lection of upper-tier intermediaries—the investor may not, for exam-
ple, even know the identity of all the upper-tier intermediaries. Yet,
the failure of an upper-tier intermediary would permit that interme-
diary’s creditors to attach securities in which the investor owns an in-
terest. And even if the investor’s intermediary were made liable, by
law or contract, for upper-tier intermediary risk, an upper-tier inter-
mediary’s failure could, in an example of systemic risk, impair the
ability of lower-tier intermediaries to pay their obligations. Recog-
nizing this risk, investors may refuse to invest.188
The balance therefore appears to favor contract enforcement.
With enforcement, investors are protected and financiers concerned
183. Id. at 185.
184. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 8-511 (2000) (giving secured creditors in “control” of an
intermediary’s securities priority over owners of those securities).
185. Cf. infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text (arguing that the justification for U.C.C. §
8-511 is that investors in the United States are protected by a federal regulatory scheme against
the risk that their ownership interests will be impaired).
186. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. Likewise, lower-tier intermediaries
themselves would merely own in personam claims to the extent their assets are undivided
interests.
187. For example, the “common response” in civil law states that lack a default rule limiting
intermediary risk is “to employ as [intermediaries] only large and stable institutions, such as
banks, that are unlikely to go bankrupt.” Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 111, at 458.
188. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text (discussing investor risk and noting that
this risk may be less significant in states where investors are protected by regulation).
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about extending credit to intermediaries can protect themselves by
demanding collateral. But without enforcement, investors would be
exposed.189 Hence, in an indirect securities holding system, contracts
in which intermediaries purport to sell undivided interests in their as-
sets to investors should be enforced, notwithstanding externalities to
the intermediary’s creditors.190
This same conclusion is reached in the context of buying and
selling loan participations. The consequence of enforcement, which
would respect the priority of investors’ (i.e., participants’) rights over
claims of an intermediary’s (i.e., a selling bank’s) creditors, might be
to somewhat discourage parties from extending credit to banks that
sell participations.191 This concern is mitigated, however, for several
reasons. The banking industry is heavily regulated in many, if not
most, states.192 A bank’s creditors thus may be comfortable in relying
on the bank’s disclosure about the extent to which its assets are sub-
ject to creditor claims. Also, most banks buy and sell loan participa-
tions.193 Creditors that worry about their ranking vis-a-vis participants
thus have little choice where to invest their money unless they are
prepared to lend to a different industry, which no doubt will have its
own set of risks. Finally, a bank traditionally obtains a large percent-
age of its funding from customer deposits, and the amount of a typical
deposit is insignificantly small compared to the bank’s assets.194 Cus-
189. Only financiers would be protected, and even their protection would be at risk where
the intermediary-borrower itself obtains its interest in securities through a financially weak
intermediary; without enforcement, the financier’s claim against its intermediary-borrower
would be effectively subject to prior claims of creditors of the financially weak intermediary.
190. But cf. infra note 249 and accompanying text (observing that in states, such as the
United States, where governmental regulation protects investors from losses caused by a failed
securities intermediary, investors’ rights need not have priority over creditors’ rights).
191. Banks traditionally borrow (at least by taking deposits) in order to re-lend money and
generally engage in the banking business.
192. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 720 (2d ed. 1997) (“As is the case in the United States, banking is a highly
regulated industry throughout the world.”).
193. See DIVISION OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REGULATION, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL § 2020.2, at 1
(1997) (“It is common practice for a bank to sell to or place with other banks loans that the
bank itself has made to its customers.”). There is, however, anecdotal evidence that banks may
be increasingly reluctant to buy loan participations precisely because of the potential for
intermediary risk. Letter from Kenneth C. Kettering, supra note 175, at 7.
194. See, e.g., Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital
Markets Approach to Bank Regulation 28 (Jan. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (observing that, even in the absence of deposit insurance, depositors would
not monitor bank riskiness because “each depositor would have so little at risk that it would
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tomers therefore are usually prepared to make deposits irrespective
of the ranking of those deposits vis-a-vis participant interests.195 And
in states where repayment of bank deposits is guarantied by the gov-
ernment,196 customers should have even less reason to worry about
their ranking.197
The consequences of non-enforcement, on the other hand, could
be significant. Participants, whose rights would be merely pari passu
with the selling banks’ unsecured claims and subordinate to the
banks’ secured claims,198 could try to protect themselves by buying
loan participations only from financially sound banks.199 That, how-
ever, could lead to bank failures because relatively weak but other-
wise viable banks, which no longer are able to diversify risk on their
loans by selling participations therein, would find it more difficult to
remain in business. Weighing these consequences, the balance, al-
though not overwhelming, appears to favor enforcement.
The same conclusion is reached even in the context of securitiza-
tion transactions. The consequence of enforcement, which would re-
spect the priority of investors’ rights over claims of an intermediary’s
make no financial sense for him or her to spend much time analyzing the riskiness of the bank”).
They also argue that “depositors do not have the financial sophistication and acumen necessary
to monitor bank activities.” Id. Customer deposits are no more than loans made by customers to
a bank and evidenced by deposit accounts or certificates of deposit. See, e.g., N.Y. County Nat’l
Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 145 (1904) (“[A] deposit of money upon general account with a
bank creates the relation of debtor and creditor.”); Morse v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 190 Cal. Rptr.
839, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“It is axiomatic that the relationship between a bank and its
depositor arising out of a general deposit is that of a debtor and creditor.”).
195. This does not mean, however, that customers should be uninterested in that ranking.
See, e.g., Kevin B. Fisher, Loan Participations and Bank Failures: The Penn Square Decisions, 44
SW. L.J. 753, 760 n.29 (1990) (noting that depositors with amounts in Penn Square Bank over
the insured maximum lost money when the FDIC liquidated the bank).
196. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813, 1817, 1821 (1994) (providing federal deposit insurance).
197. For example, Van Der Weide & Kini observe:
under the current scheme of [U.S.] federal deposit insurance, most depositors —
except for those who have placed over $100,000 with a bank . . . —have no incentive
to monitor or influence a bank’s activities [because] [i]f a bank fails, the federal
government will fulfill the bank’s contractual obligation to return the depositors’
principal.
Van Der Weide & Kini, supra note 194, at 27-28. The government guarantor, however, may
worry about that ranking because it affects the likelihood that the state will be able to recover
on its subrogation claim against the failed bank.
198. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
199. The concern expressed in the context of an indirect securities holding system, that the
failure of an upper-tier intermediary would permit that intermediary’s creditors to attach
securities in which the investor owns an interest, can be controlled by the participant buying
participations in loans originated by the selling bank, as opposed to buying participations in
upper-tier loan participations.
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(i.e., an originator’s) creditors, should be minimal. Creditors will not
be discouraged from extending credit to originators, because the type
of non-recourse financing typified by a securitization increases unse-
cured creditor value.200
The consequences of non-enforcement, on the other hand, may
well be significant. If investors, whose rights to repayment would be
suspended and possibly impaired in the event of the originator’s
bankruptcy,201 try to protect themselves by engaging in securitization
transactions only with financially sound originators, troubled, but vi-
able, originators would be deprived of an important source of capital
market liquidity. Even if those originators attempt to obtain securiti-
zation financing by restructuring investor interests as interests in
whole receivables, as opposed to undivided interests in pools of re-
ceivables,202 that would significantly and unnecessarily increase trans-
action costs.203 Weighing these consequences, the balance again ap-
pears to favor enforcement of contracts in which intermediaries
purport to sell undivided interests in their assets to investors.
The foregoing analysis has shown, for each transaction pattern,
that an intermediary and investors should be able contractually to al-
locate their respective undivided interests in assets held by the inter-
mediary. Stated more intuitively, if in the context of one of these
transaction patterns a given transfer of assets would constitute a sale,
then the fact that only an undivided interest in those assets is being
transferred should not defeat sale treatment.204 Intermediary risk thus
should not arise.
Possible arguments against contract enforcement. There appear to
be only two arguments, both of which fail, against this conclusion.
The first argument is that, as between two parties, risk sometimes
should be allocated to the lower-cost monitor of the risk.205 In our
200. See Schwarcz, supra note 174, at 462-65 (explaining how non-recourse debt is an
exception to the general rule that debtors “will not incur secured debt until they need liquidity
and cannot obtain unsecured financing”).
201. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
202. This increases the likelihood that investor rights will have priority over creditor rights.
203. See 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, supra note 80, § 3.03[A], at 3-13
(explaining that the undivided interest structure reduces the transaction costs associated with
numerous separate purchases).
204. Cf. supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (addressing this perspective in the context
of securitization).
205. See, e.g., HARRISON, supra note 176, at 94 (arguing that “[f]rom an economic point of
view, it makes sense to allocate . . . risk to the party who can control the event or insure against
it more economically”).
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case, however, the intermediary’s creditors are the lower-cost moni-
tors because they already have an incentive to monitor the intermedi-
ary, the only party to which they can look for repayment. Investors,
on the other hand, have no incentive, absent the existence of inter-
mediary risk, to monitor the intermediary because they can only look
to (and therefore only will monitor) the issuer for repayment.
Concern over intermediary risk would only increase the overall
monitoring cost by imposing on investors the additional incentive to
monitor their intermediaries but, because an intermediary’s bank-
ruptcy would continue to jeopardize creditor repayment, not com-
mensurately reduce the monitoring incentive of creditors.206 Further-
more, intermediary risk may increase more than monitoring cost if
investors opt out of transactions in which this risk could arise. For ex-
ample, investors faced with monitoring their immediate intermediary,
as well as all upper-tier intermediaries (whose identities may not even
be known),207 may decide to shift their investments to securities that
are subject to direct holding.208 This shift, however, would further in-
crease costs by forgoing the very real benefits that led to the creation
of the indirect holding system.209 Actual experience with loan partici-
pation and securitization transactions illustrates the cost increases
from opting out. Banks frequently engage in the more complex and
costly process of loan syndication in order to avoid intermediary risk
from participations.210 Parties also frequently contract out of interme-
diary risk in securitizations by structuring their transactions, at in-
creased cost, as sales of whole receivables.211
The second argument is that divided ownership is traditionally
viewed as inefficient because it would be awkward or impractical for
206. Even though the existence of intermediary risk means that creditors may also have
claims against investors’ interests in securities, the creditors’ primary source of recovery remains
the intermediary; hence, creditors will continue to have incentives to monitor the intermediary.
207. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
208. This shift would occur because intermediary risk would discourage investors from
investing in securities held through the indirect holding system.
209. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing the efficiencies and cost
savings of the indirect holding system).
210. See Letter from Kenneth C. Kettering, supra note 175, at 7 (observing that in recent
years “the participation market has largely dried up, largely on account of concerns about
intermediary risk”).
211. Cf. supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting concern that an SPV that purports to
purchase only an undivided interest in, as opposed to whole, receivables may be unable to gain
an ownership interest in the underlying receivables).
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the market alone to determine which third-party transferees are to
share possession with current owners. For example,
[D]ivided ownership makes transfer difficult in practice even if there
is no formal limitation. If 50 different people are joint tenants of a
piece of property, a sale of the property will require them to agree
both on the price and on the division of the proceeds among them;
there will be holdout problems.212
This argument fails because the foregoing inefficiencies do not apply
to the transaction patterns of this Article. Sharing possession of
commercial intangibles, such as securities (in the case of the indirect
holding system), loans (in the case of loan participations) and receiv-
ables (in the case of securitizations), is neither awkward nor impracti-
cal. Nor would sharing lead to holdout problems. The price of securi-
ties is readily determinable from the market, so each investor’s
undivided interest in securities at any time is simply the dollar
amount of such investor’s investment in such securities divided by the
aggregate dollar amount of all unpaid investments in such securities.
No pricing issue arises in the case of loan participations because each
participant is merely entitled to its undivided fraction of the actual
collections on the underlying loan. And there are usually just two par-
ties, the originator and the SPV, that own undivided interests in re-
ceivables.213 Accordingly, such contractual sharing of undivided inter-
ests should not, in and of itself, be inefficient.
C. Thesis
For each transaction pattern, an intermediary and investors
therefore should be able to make an enforceable contract that allo-
cates their respective undivided interests in assets held by the inter-
mediary, notwithstanding the creation of material externalities. A
creditor of the intermediary thus should not be able to reach an inves-
tor’s undivided interest.
This conclusion, that there should be no intermediary risk, is
normative. In reality, there remains uncertainty whether externalities
212. POSNER, supra note 158, at 86. In this context, Professor Goode observes that “ever
since the 1925 property legislation English law has restricted the number of legal (as opposed to
equitable) co-owners to four in order to restrict the number of people with whom the purchaser
has to deal.” E-mail from Roy Goode, Professor of Law, University of Oxford, to Steven L.
Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Aug. 18, 2000) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
213. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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would prevent contract enforcement, especially given the potentially
large number of national jurisdictions that may be involved. Uncer-
tainty, in turn, increases costs and discourages transactions. I there-
fore next examine how this normative thesis can be implemented as
positive law in order to reduce this uncertainty and enable parties to
clearly understand their rights.214
IV.  IMPLEMENTATION
In a domestic legal system, implementation of a thesis into law is
relatively straightforward: articulate the thesis as a rule of law and
enact the law. But intermediary risk arises in international as well as
domestic transactions.215 In an international context, it is additionally
necessary—in order to minimize transaction costs216—to implement
the rule of law in a way that binds parties in different nation-states
with maximum uniformity. 
In this part, I first examine how the thesis should be articulated
as a rule of law. Thereafter, I examine how that rule should be im-
plemented into law, taking into account that in many transactions in-
volving intermediary risk, the parties—investors, intermediaries, and
their creditors—may be located in diverse states. Finally, I conclude
that the rule should be implemented as a uniform model law.
A. Articulating the Thesis as a Rule of Law
The thesis asserts that an intermediary and investors should be
able to make an enforceable contract that allocates their respective
undivided interests in assets held by the intermediary, notwithstand-
ing the creation of material externalities.217 Because the thesis focuses
on the enforceability of contracts, the simplest way to articulate it as a
214. Cf. RANDALL D. GUYNN, MODERNIZING SECURITIES OWNERSHIP, TRANSFER AND
PLEDGING LAWS 60 (1996) (arguing that implementation is “perhaps the most challenging
aspect of the task of modernizing the commercial law of the securities holding and transfer
system”).
215. See supra Part II (describing the international orientation of these transactions).
216. See Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, But Not Lawless, 8
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 255, 256 (1998) (arguing that “market and institutional
intermediation are unlikely to arise, let alone flourish, without a legal infrastructure that
provides uniform, predictable, stable rules of behavior”); Tamar Frankel & Robert D. Cooter,
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New
Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1673, 1677 (1996) (discussing the economic impact of
judicially enforced social norms on markets).
217. See supra Part III.C.
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rule of law is to restate it in contract law terms. A hypothetical con-
tract law rule thus might state that a contract between an intermedi-
ary and investors that purports to allocate their respective undivided
interests in assets held by the intermediary shall be enforceable.
Contract law, however, might be insufficient. In some states, con-
tract law may only govern the relationship between parties to a con-
tract, thus not binding their third-party claimants. Indeed, some have
argued that this limitation is implicit even in U.S. jurisprudence.218 In
these states, contract law would be insufficient because any articula-
tion of the thesis as a rule of law must bind the intermediary’s credi-
tors, in order to confirm that a creditor of the intermediary should not
be able to reach an investor’s undivided interest.219
Property law serves this function, and also is a more intuitive
source of law for the thesis than contract law. In contrast to contract
law, property law provides rights “good against the world,” thereby
binding non-contracting creditors.220 Moreover, the consequence of
the hypothetical contract law rule—that a contract between an inter-
mediary and investors that purports to allocate their respective undi-
vided interests in assets held by the intermediary shall be enforce-
able—is that such an allocation is effective to transfer ownership of
these interests. Transferring ownership, however, is traditionally ad-
dressed by property law.221
218. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in
the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV.
267, 289 (1988) (observing that, analytically, “contract is a right good only as against
determinate persons—those with whom one has made the contract”).
219. See supra Part III.C.
220. See McConnell, supra note 218, at 289 (observing that on the “sophisticated legal basis,
expounded by Professor Wesley Hohfeld . . . the distinctive feature of property is that it is a
right ‘good against the world,’ while contract is a right good only as against determinate
persons . . . with whom one has made the contract” (citing Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917))). McConnell further
explains that:
A particular object may give rise to both contractual rights and property rights. X
may contract with Y for exclusive use and enjoyment of real property owed by Y. X
has a contractual right as against Y; if Y enters the property he is in breach of
contract. However, X also has obtained, by virtue of the contract, rights against the
world, in the nature of property rights.
Id.
221. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth That the U.C.C.
Killed “Property,” 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1281, 1285-89 (1996) (defining property as “the legal
relationship among legal subjects concerning the possession, enjoyment, and alienation of
objects”); cf. POSNER, supra note 158, at 89 (observing that “[p]roblems in the transfer of
property rights are part of a larger problem, that of deciding who owns what property”). To
some extent, however, this distinction between property and contract is semantic because these
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The thesis therefore would have broader and more intuitive ap-
plication if formulated as a rule of property law.222 Such a rule tenta-
tively could be articulated as follows:
The transfer of an undivided fractional interest in property shall
constitute a valid and enforceable transfer of that interest to the
same extent and in the same manner as if that interest had been a
separate asset.223 The transfer shall not be affected by the fact that
the property in which the interest is being transferred is itself an un-
divided fractional interest.224
The next step of this analysis is to examine how this proposed
rule should be implemented into property law on an international ba-
sis. Before engaging in that examination, however, it is necessary to
bodies of law have much overlap. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 218, at 287 (“If property is
viewed in the sense of modern financial property—corporate shares, electronic transfers, bank
deposits, and so forth . . . property is little more than a web of contractual commitments.”).
222. A property-based rule also may be easier to adopt across legal systems. See, e.g.,
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., & Atsushi Kinami, Transfer, Pledge, Clearance and Settlement in the
Japanese and United States Government Securities Markets, 12 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 517, 567
(1991) (noting that, in the context of the Japanese indirect holding system, “changes in law that
would clearly recognize and give effect to property rights in uncertificated securities controlled
by intermediaries would seem to be advisable”). In the context of revising UCC Article 8,
however, some scholars have opposed property-based rules. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 13, at
310 (arguing that “a property law construct for resolving priorities among claimants to fungible
bulks of securities is a fundamentally flawed approach”); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8
Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 291, 357 (arguing that “traditional property tracing and bona fide purchaser rules
were awkward, impracticable, or even impossible and unjust means of determining distributions
of assets among rival claimants in intermediary insolvency cases”). This opposition does not
mean, however, that a property-based rule must be inappropriate. These scholars appear to
have been opposing the application of traditional property rules that attempt to trace property
to specific underlying securities. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra, at 370 (arguing that “a customer in
the indirect holding system may not be treated . . . as the owner of any specific, identifiable,
underlying security held by the securities intermediary”). They actually do not oppose, but
rather affirm, the idea of undivided interest ownership. See id. at 382 (concluding that, under
Revised Article 8, the investor would have a pro rata interest in the fungible bulk of all interests
in that financial asset held by the intermediary, not “an exclusive property right in any specific
identifiable financial asset”).
223. This language is based in part on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 326(1)
(1981).
224. My analysis of which parties—an intermediary’s creditors, or its investors—should bear
the externalities was limited to the transaction patterns discussed in this Article. See supra note
177 and accompanying text. One therefore might argue that the foregoing rule should be limited
to those types of transactions. However, because the intuitive nature of the rule suggests that it
is likely to be valid in other contexts as well, I have chosen to state the rule, and to propose in
Appendix A a model law to regulate intermediary risk, without this limitation.
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examine whether the proposed rule should be subject to any excep-
tions.
B. Exceptions to the Proposed Rule
As a reality check, it is useful to compare the proposed rule to
existing law that addresses intermediary risk. The most comprehen-
sive such law is Article 8 of the UCC,225 which conceptually is consis-
tent with the rule subject to three exceptions. I analyze below
whether these exceptions also should qualify the rule.
The exception for multiple tiers of intermediaries. A practical
problem arises where there are multiple tiers of intermediaries. An
investor then may not be in privity with all of the intermediaries that
hold assets in which the investor owns an interest. It would be diffi-
cult for intermediaries that are not in privity to know the identity of
those investors or the amount of their interests.
In the context of the indirect holding system, Article 8 responds
to this difficulty by limiting the ability of investors (and their credi-
tors) to assert rights or claims against intermediaries that are not in
privity. However, limiting the assertion of rights and claims is inher-
ently confusing because it creates a conceptual paradox: an investor is
protected from intermediary risk because it has a property right in the
underlying assets, yet neither the investor nor its creditors may di-
rectly reach that property right to the extent it is held by intermedi-
aries with which the investor is not in privity.
Should the proposed rule similarly limit the assertion of rights
and claims? My analysis starts by examining this limitation under Ar-
ticle 8. Under that Article, an investor has an undivided ownership in-
terest in securities (or interests therein) held by the intermediary
from which it purchased the interest.226 Logically, therefore, that un-
divided ownership interest should constitute an ownership interest in
each underlying ownership interest because a property interest in
property is itself property. For example, an investor that owns a 10%
undivided interest in its broker’s 20% undivided interest in XYZ
Company stock held by a depository should own a 2% undivided in-
terest in that stock. This does not, however, mean that the investor
may enforce its ownership interest directly against the depository, or
that the investor’s creditors may seek to attach that interest. Such di-
225. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
226. U.C.C. § 8-503(a) (2000).
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rect enforcement would conflict with “[o]ne of the basic principles of
the indirect holding system,” that “securities intermediaries owe du-
ties only to their own customers.”227 This principle respects the im-
practicality of imposing duties on an intermediary with respect to an
investor whose identity and ownership interest is not recorded on the
intermediary’s books.228
Article 8 implements this principle by providing that an investor
“cannot assert rights directly against . . . intermediaries through
whom the [investor’s] intermediary holds the positions.”229 Thus,
“[t]he interest of a debtor in a security entitlement may be reached by
a creditor only by legal process upon the securities intermediary with
whom the debtor’s securities account is maintained.”230
In reality, however, this limitation affects procedural rights but
does not change the substantive nature of the investor’s intermediary
risk. Even though an investor may not enforce its ownership interest
directly against upper-tier intermediaries with which it is not in priv-
ity, creditors of a failed upper-tier intermediary are prohibited from
attaching interests held by that intermediary for its investors.231 Those
interests would be property of those investors, who in turn (as inter-
mediaries) would be required to hold those interests as property of
their own investors.232 Thus, Article 8 solves the practical problem of
multiple tiers of intermediaries without increasing intermediary risk.
227. Id. § 8-507 cmt. 3; see also id. § 8-102 cmt. 7 (emphasizing that “the definition of
entitlement holder is, in most cases, limited to the person specifically designated as such on the
records of the intermediary”); id. § 8-115 cmt. 4 (noting that section 8-115 “embodies one of the
fundamental principles of the Article 8 indirect holding system—that a securities intermediary
owes duties only to its own entitlement holders”).
228. See, e.g., id. § 8-507 cmt. 3 (observing that in the indirect holding system, “an
intermediary is not required to determine at its peril whether a person who purports to be
authorized to act for an entitlement holder is in fact authorized to do so”); Rogers, supra note
13, at 1455 (observing that an intermediary “has no way of knowing anything about its
customer’s customers [and,] [a]ccordingly, the realities of the marketplace dictate that an
intermediary can only be held responsible to its own customers”).
229. U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 2; see also id. § 8-501 cmt. 5 (stating that “the nature of a security
entitlement is that the intermediary is undertaking duties only to the person identified [on its
records] as the entitlement holder”); id. § 8-507(a) (describing the circumstances under which a
securities intermediary satisfies its duty to comply with an entitlement order); id. § 8-507(a) cmt.
3 (providing that a securities intermediary shall comply with an order only if the order is
originated by a person identified in the intermediary’s records).
230. Id. § 8-112(c).
231. Id. § 8-503.
232. Id. This pattern would repeat for each tier of intermediaries.
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This same procedural exception, which solves the practical
problem of multiple tiers of intermediaries without increasing inter-
mediary risk, appears to be equally appropriate for the proposed rule.
In any indirect holding system, it is impractical for upper-tier inter-
mediaries to maintain records about, or even to know the existence
of, investors with which they are not in privity.233 In the context of
loan participations, multiple tiering of intermediaries is less likely but,
where it exists,234 the ultimate participant and the lender will not be in
privity and the lender therefore may not know of the ultimate partici-
pant’s existence. Multiple tiering is not, however, likely to occur in se-
curitization transactions, so this exception would be neutral in those
cases.235
The exception where investors do not need priority in order to
satisfy their rights. The second exception arises where investors don’t
need priority in order to satisfy their rights.236 This exception, how-
ever, is trivial because intermediary risk then would be non-
consequential; therefore, any intermediary risk permitted by this ex-
ception could not give rise to systemic risk.
The exception where secured creditors are in control of an inter-
mediary’s securities. The third exception arises where secured credi-
tors are in control of an intermediary’s securities.237 This exception
appears extraordinary because it subordinates a third party’s owner-
ship interest to a security interest given without consent of the
owner.238
233. The term “investors” being deemed to include all lower-tier intermediaries. See supra
Part II.A at 1552 (defining the term “investors” to generally include not only investors but also
intermediaries that have rights in securities held by other intermediaries).
234. Multiple tiering would exist, for example, where a participant sells an undivided
interest in its own participation to another participant.
235. The foregoing discussion does not purport to address the ability of investors to enforce
rights, on account of their undivided interests, directly against issuers. Such an ability should
derive from the fact that these undivided interests are property rights in claims against the
issuer. I note, however, that parties can contractually restrict such direct enforcement. For
example, a lending bank that wishes to restrict participants from directly suing the borrower can
impose that restriction in the participation agreement. Likewise, an originator that wishes to
restrict the SPV from taking enforcement action directly against receivable obligors can impose
that restriction in the securitization documentation.
236. Under the UCC, investors have property rights only to the extent needed to satisfy a
lower-tier holder’s rights in securities. U.C.C. § 8-503.
237. Under the UCC, secured creditors in control of an intermediary’s securities have
priority over lower-tier holders. U.C.C. § 8-511.
238. Thus, in the event of a dispute between investors and secured creditors of an insolvent
intermediary, the investors’ ownership interest would be subordinate to secured creditor claims.
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One possible explanation for this exception is pragmatic: “Since
securities intermediaries generally do not segregate securities in such
fashion that one could identify particular securities as the ones held
for customers, it would not be realistic for this section to state that
‘customers’ securities’ are not subject to creditors’ claims.”239 This ex-
planation indirectly turns on the general precept that “a person buy-
ing an entitlement must [be able to] ascertain the owner of the enti-
tlement and the existence of any other qualifications to or
encumbrances on that interest.”240 Because secured creditors are un-
able to ascertain the identity of the investors or the existence of quali-
fications or encumbrances, the UCC creates a bright-line test making
such information irrelevant. But this explanation is unconvincing be-
cause if a bright-line test is needed to address the inability to identify
which securities are held for customers, the test could as easily favor
ownership interests over secured claims.241
Another explanation is that the exception merely reflects how
the market actually works: “[t]oday, in the securities industry, second-
in-time purchasers, such as secured creditors and repo buyers, regu-
larly prevail over first-in-time owners, such as customers.”242 Again,
however, I do not find this explanation convincing: one should not re-
spond to an “ought” question with an “is” answer.243
The official comments to Article 8 nonetheless offer a third,
more compelling, explanation.244 Investors are protected in the United
States by a federal regulatory scheme against the risk that their own-
ership interests in securities held by a failed intermediary will be im-
paired.245 This government protection thus minimizes the conse-
239. U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 1.
240. Whincop, supra note 11, at 41, 44.
241. Moreover, the rationale is inconsistent with the qualification, which favors secured but
not unsecured creditor claims. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
242. Schroeder, supra note 222, at 298; see also Rogers, supra note 13, at 1525-26 (arguing
that this exception “has been the law for centuries”).
243. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107
YALE L.J. 1807, 1814-15 (1998) (arguing that “the appropriate response to an ‘ought’ claim is an
‘ought not’ claim, not an ‘is’ claim”).
244. See U.C.C. § 8-511 cmt. 2. Even this rationale fails to explain, however, why unsecured
creditor claims are not likewise favored.
245. Under Rules 8c-1 and 15c2-1 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, a securities intermediary is prohibited from giving a security interest in customer
securities without the customer’s consent. See id. (paraphrasing those SEC Rules). Brokers are
required to maintain a sufficient inventory of unencumbered securities to satisfy customer
claims. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2000); see also U.C.C. § 8-504 (mirroring that requirement). If a
failed broker fails to maintain a sufficient unencumbered inventory, its customers are protected
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quences of favoring secured creditors.246 Absent this type of compre-
hensive regulatory protection, however, it is doubtful that Article 8
would ever favor secured claims over ownership interests.247 Accord-
ingly, absent similar worldwide regulatory protection, there would
appear to be insufficient justification for the proposed rule to favor an
intermediary’s secured creditors over investors.248 Nonetheless, on a
case-by-case basis, states that have regulatory schemes protecting in-
vestors from the consequences thereof may wish to consider whether
against loss under the Securities Investor Protection Act, which established the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation to pay that loss. U.C.C. § 8-511 cmt. 2; see also Securities
Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-1(d) (1994) (requiring the trustee to conduct an
investigation of the debtor, report his findings to the court and submit a statement of his
investigation to the SIPC); id. § 78fff-3(a) (providing that in certain circumstances the SIPC
shall advance moneys to the trustee in order to “provide for prompt payment and satisfaction of
net equity claims of customers of the debtor”).
246. But cf. David A. Kessler, Note, Investor Casualties in the War for Market Efficiency, 9
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1307, 1308-09 (1996) (arguing that there are gaps in this government
protection).
247. See U.C.C. § 8-511 cmt. 2 (stating that “Article 8 is premised on the view that the
important policy of protecting investors against the risk of wrongful conduct by their
intermediaries is sufficiently treated by other law”); see also Schroeder, supra note 222, at 300-
01 (cautioning that “[w]ithout [the regulatory protection provided in the United States by the
SEC and SIPC], the overall preference given to the lending industry over consumers by the
proposed revisions must be rethought”). But see Rogers, supra note 13, at 1539 (arguing that a
highly regulated securities system is not essential to the functioning of Revised Article 8).
248. There also is a fourth, although circular, explanation. Because property is transferable,
“the law must describe how competing claims for the entitlement, each of which is based on an
apparently enforceable trade, are to be resolved.” Whincop, supra note 11, at 44. The general
default rule is that an owner’s rights trump subsequent claims. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note
222, at 297 (noting that the derivation rule protecting possession is the default rule). In certain
cases, however, the law favors subsequent claimants, such as bona fide purchasers of goods and
holders in due course of negotiable instruments, in order to encourage participation in markets
for the property. Id. This reflects the negotiability aspect of property. Id. at 296-97. This aspect
of property even applies in a trust context. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note
102, § 2 cmt. d (“[An] equitable interest in a thing is traditionally extinguished by the transfer of
the legal interest in it to a bona fide purchaser when a legal interest in the thing would not be so
extinguished.”). It is this aspect of property, the argument goes, that justifies the favoring of
subsequent secured creditors over investors required by Article 8. See Schroeder, supra note
222, at 297 (asserting that “[p]roposed Article 8 comes down firmly in favor of the negotiation
principle”). The flaw in this argument, however, is that no compelling reasons have yet been
advanced as to why the default rule should be modified in this case. To the contrary, one might
argue that original owners should be protected when the default rule is modified. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), 9-307(1) (noting that a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes free of
a security interest but the security interest continues in the sale proceeds). Yet absent
government protection (discussed supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text), investors would
be unprotected.
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it is appropriate to favor an intermediary’s secured creditors over in-
vestors as an exception to the proposed rule.249
Restatement of the proposed rule as qualified by these exceptions.
The foregoing analysis thus indicates that there should be only one
general exception to the proposed rule, to address the problem of
multiple tiering of intermediaries. Taking this exception into account,
the rule can be restated as follows (as so restated, the “Rule”):
The transfer of an undivided fractional interest in property shall
constitute a valid and enforceable transfer of that interest to the
same extent and in the same manner as if that interest had been a
separate asset. The transfer shall not be affected by the fact that the
property in which the interest is being transferred is itself an undi-
vided fractional interest. Holders of property in which undivided in-
terests have been transferred shall, to the extent of such transfers, be
deemed to hold such property for their transferees, but only trans-
ferors and transferees that are in privity may prosecute rights di-
rectly against each other on account of such transfers.
In addition, states that have regulatory schemes protecting investors
from the consequences thereof may wish to consider a non-uniform
exception to the Rule, favoring an intermediary’s secured creditors
over investors.250
I next examine how the Rule can be implemented into law on an
international basis.251
C. Applying the Rule to Cross-Border Transactions
In general, there are three ways that a rule can be implemented
internationally. First, states can agree with one or more other states
that they and their residents will observe the rule; this approach is
usually referred to as a treaty or convention.252 Second, the rule can be
249. This exception may be useful, for example, to encourage asset-based lending to
securities firms.
250. See supra notes 237-49 and accompanying text.
251. Cf. EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 197 (“If markets are to operate efficiently
and the greatest social benefit is to be attained, then systemic risk must be regulated on an
international scale.”); Mooney & Kinami, supra note 222, at 568 (noting in the context of the
indirect holding system that “[t]he harmonization of law and practice in the various domestic
regimes could be of great benefit in the cross-border environment”).
252. See, e.g., THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 91 (2d ed. 1990) (“The term ‘treaty,’ as used on the international plane, describes
international agreements in general, whether they be denominated conventions, pacts,
covenants, charters, protocols, etc. These different names have no legal significance; the same
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formulated as a uniform model law to be enacted into national law by
each state that wishes to do so. This approach might be characterized
as a form of private international law.253 Third, the rule can be ex-
pressed as model language for parties to incorporate into their con-
tracts as they deem appropriate. In this section, I argue that the Rule
should be implemented as a uniform model law.
Treaty approach. It is theoretically possible for the Rule to be
implemented as a treaty, but such a formal approach is unnecessary
and might raise unwarranted political hurdles. It is unnecessary be-
cause the Rule does not purport to govern transactions between
states qua states,254 merely transactions between residents of different
states.255 Furthermore, one of the major advantages provided by a
treaty—the ability to impose an international dispute settlement
mechanism256—is not needed in the context of the
legal rules apply to one as to the other.”). In the context of United States domestic law,
however, the term “treaty” has a more limited meaning. Id. at 91-92.
253. See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (3d ed.
1999) (observing that “[i]n contrast to the public international law of rules between states, there
has long been private international law dealing with the activities of individuals, corporations,
and other private entities when their activities crossed national borders”). It should be
cautioned, however, that this characterization is necessarily imprecise because “[t]he
distinctions between public and private international law have become increasingly artificial as
many states and their instrumentalities have entered the marketplace in a major way . . . and as
commerce and foreign policy have become increasingly intertwined.” Id. at 19-20.
254. I recognize that treaties, such as the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, can be used for the international unification of private law. I argue,
however, that there may be a simpler way to unify private law in the context of intermediary
risk.
255. Although investors and creditors of an intermediary ordinarily would be private
residents, some intermediaries may be quasi-governmental entities. In Korea, for example, the
only depository intermediary is the Korea Securities Depository, a public corporation
established and regulated by the government. See Chunggwonkoraebop [Securities and
Exchange Act], Act No. 4701 of 1994, art. 173, translated in 11 KOREA LEGIS. RES. INST.,
STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 716 (1997). That is irrelevant to this analysis, however,
so long as such intermediaries are bound by the national law of their state.
256. Ever since the days of antiquity, treaties were used by princes and states to settle
international disputes. PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 1 (José Mico
& Peter Haggenmacher trans., 1989); see also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2d ed. 1993) (describing treaties between the Jews and the Romans,
Syrians and Spartans). Many international treaties continue to provide mechanisms to settle
such disputes. For example, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute
(ICSID) provides a relatively low-cost and unbureaucratic procedure for adjudicating certain
disputes between a state and its creditors. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A
Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1024 (2000). The 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention contains an elaborate system of dispute settlement, which, in most cases,
will lead to a binding third-party decision. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN
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Rule.257 Implementing the Rule as a treaty might raise unwarranted
political hurdles because some states, such as the United States, re-
quire extraordinary measures to bind themselves to a treaty.258 In
practice, a rule that does not govern transactions between states qua
states often can be more easily implemented through a uniform
model law:
Throughout the discussions [of UNCITRAL’s proposal for interna-
tional rules governing cross-border corporate insolvency], a signifi-
cant minority of countries favored a treaty rather than a model law,
in part because they favored a system based on reciprocity. How-
ever, a substantial majority, in which the United States took a lead-
ing role, favored the model-law approach as a first step that could be
agreed and implemented far more quickly and more generally than a
treaty.259
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (7th ed. 1997). The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Agreement Establishing World Trade Organization (WTO) also
provide dispute-settling mechanisms. Id. at 300.
257. The Rule deals mostly with private parties—investors, intermediaries, and their
creditors. Hence, disputes under the Rule are unlikely to involve a sovereign, and the judiciary
of the state whose law applies will provide the dispute settling mechanism. However, even if the
intermediary involved in a dispute is state-owned, the qualified immunities doctrine of
international law would not allow the intermediary to enjoy immunity on its commercial
activities so long as the intermediary is a commercial entity dealing with other commercial
entities. See MALANCZUK, supra note 256, at 118-19 (observing that “the prevailing trend . . . is
to . . . grant immunity to foreign states only in respect of their governmental acts (acts iure
imperii), not in respect of their commercial acts (acts iure gestionis)”). Thus, the judiciary of the
state whose law applies would again provide the dispute-settling mechanism.
258. The United States Constitution requires, for example, that treaties be entered into only
with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Professor Bergsten adds that he
found in [his] days as Secretary of UNCITRAL . . . that the biggest obstacle to getting
an UNCITRAL treaty adopted in many countries was that the subject matter was one
in which the Ministry of Justice was interested (being responsible for development of
the domestic legal system), but the initiative had to come from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, which had the monopoly on commencement of the bureaucratic
actions leading to the submission of a treaty to Government and then to Parliament
for action.
E-mail from Eric E. Bergsten, Professor of Law Emeritus, Pace University, to Steven L.
Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Aug. 18, 2000) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
259. Memorandum from Jay L. Westbrook, Professor of Law, University of Texas, to
National Bankruptcy Review Commission 3 (July 29, 1997) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). Professor Bergsten adds a practical observation:
The overwhelming reason for not proposing your suggested text [i.e., the text in
Appendix A] as a convention is that it is too short. That may sound silly, but a
convention is heavy artillery. . . . Just as the army does not use a 155 mm howitzer to
take out a single sniper, so one does not use a convention for a single substantive
paragraph, no matter how important the rule in that paragraph.
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Uniform model-law approach: States that are prepared to adopt
the Rule through a treaty therefore may simply prefer to enact it into
national law based on a model-law template. This sometimes is re-
ferred to as a uniform model-law approach because, whenever a rule
is formulated as a model law, the intention is for states to adopt the
law in as uniform a manner as possible.260 Such an approach would be
almost as effective as a treaty because, like a treaty, a model law
would equally bind residents of states that have adopted it. Indeed, a
model law, once adopted, is part of a state’s national law, whereas
treaties may have to provide that their rules be separately enacted by
the state into national law in order to bind residents.261
Another way of thinking about this is that a model law repre-
sents parallel legislation—a uniform text that is intended to be en-
acted into the national law of each state—whereas a treaty or conven-
tion represents an international agreement between states. Yet the
parties on which this Article focuses—investors, intermediaries, and
their creditors—are not themselves states. Therefore, in order to bind
these parties to the Rule, a treaty would have to require each ratify-
ing state to enact the Rule into national law. From the standpoint of
these parties, enacting a model law based on the Rule would have the
same effect.
This is not to say, however, that a model-law approach is cate-
gorically better than a treaty for implementing the Rule. A treaty ap-
proach, for example, could use the negotiation process to build con-
 E-mail from Eric E. Bergsten, supra note 258.
260. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay L. Westbrook, supra note 259, at 3-4 (observing, in
the context of UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, that “[w]here the text is
a model law, it is understood that it should be adopted in as uniform a manner as possible, but
that some adjustments to fit each national legal system are inevitable”); see also UNITED
NATIONS, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT 23 (1999) (noting that when incorporating the text of a model law into its legal
system, a state may modify or leave out some of its provisions, whereas in the case of a treaty
the possibility of changes being made to the uniform text—referred to as “reservations”—is
much more restricted).
261. In the United Kingdom, for example, a treaty becomes effective in international law
when ratified by the Queen but usually has no effect in municipal law until approved by
Parliament. MALANCZUK, supra note 256, at 66. Most Commonwealth countries (including
Canada and India) follow English tradition. Id.; cf. JANIS, supra note 256, at 95-99 (discussing
countries in which the legislature participates in the process of ratification, so that ratification
becomes a legislative act and the treaty becomes effective in international and national law
simultaneously); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 771-75 (1988)
(explaining when a treaty is “self-executing” and may be applied by U.S. courts without further
legislative action).
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sensus around the Rule and increase its perceived legitimacy.262 Any
state unwilling or unable to ratify the treaty always could choose to
enact national legislation consistent with the Rule. Also, a model law
lacks an international oversight mechanism to ensure the consistency
of each national law enacted pursuant to the template, whereas a
treaty could create such an oversight mechanism.263 The ultimate
choice of whether to implement the Rule through a model law or a
treaty therefore will be a political decision.
Model contract language approach. It is unrealistic, however, for
the Rule to be implemented through model language for parties to
incorporate into their contracts. This is because the parties primarily
intended to be governed by the Rule—creditors of intermediaries—
are not parties to, and therefore are not bound by, contracts between
intermediaries and investors.264 In contrast, a state that enacts the
Rule into its national law thereby binds not only intermediaries and
investors but also creditors of intermediaries that are resident in that
state.
This Article therefore proposes that the Rule be implemented
through a model law. Implementation, however, is always imperfect
in international law because there is no centralized legislative or ad-
judicatory source of lawmaking.265 Neither a model law nor, indeed, a
treaty can bind creditors from states that choose not to participate.
Nonetheless, as more states enact the Rule as a model law, more
creditors will become bound thereby and its influence will increase.266
262. Professor Garcimartin further argues that “a convention has more ‘autoritas’ than a
uniform law. Politicians take more seriously a convention (signed by other states) than a model
law [and therefore] are more [willing] to put it in the political agenda.” E-mail from Francisco
Garcimartin, Professor of Law, Autonomous University of Madrid, to Steven L. Schwarcz,
Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Jan. 5, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
263. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 256, at 1017 n.352 (arguing for a treaty rather than uniform
legislation to implement a sovereign debt-restructuring scheme).
264. Indeed, even if intermediaries separately attempted to bind each of their creditors to
the Rule, they could not bind involuntary creditors, such as tort creditors.
265. See BUERGENTHAL & MAIER, supra note 252, at 19 (observing that “[v]iewed in terms
of law-making, international law is a primitive legal system”).
266. For example, legislation based on UNCITRAL’s 1985 Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration has been enacted to date in more than thirty states. UNITED NATIONS
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, STATUS OF CONVENTIONS AND MODEL LAWS 13, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last modified Jan. 17, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal); see also JACK J. COE, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 96 (1997) (observing that this Model Law
“enjoys global recognition”). Legislation based on UNCITRAL’s 1996 Model Law on
Electronic Commerce has been enacted to date in more than a dozen states. UNITED NATIONS
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CONCLUSION
Worldwide financial markets are increasingly dependent on
structures in which an intermediary and investors share beneficial
rights in assets held by the intermediary. This creates uncertainty,
however, whether creditors of the intermediary, in the event of its
failure, can claim against all of these assets or merely against the in-
termediary’s interest therein. The uncertainty, in turn, increases the
costs for parties engaging in these transactions, and may discourage
certain of these transactions altogether. Furthermore, this “interme-
diary risk”—that an intermediary’s creditors can claim against an in-
vestor’s interest in assets held by the intermediary—can be systemic:
the failure of an intermediary can trigger a chain reaction of failures
of investors that contract with the intermediary.
The issue of intermediary risk nonetheless remains generally un-
resolved under existing legal systems. Although some states have at-
tempted to resolve it by statute in the context of a single transaction
pattern, there has been no attempt to examine intermediary risk in a
larger context. Resolution is important, however, not only to reduce
costs and minimize systemic risk. As a theoretical matter, intermedi-
ary risk raises innovative legal issues that blur the boundaries be-
tween commercial law and property. Moreover, the analysis of inter-
mediary risk yields insights into the broader question of whether
rights of one party in assets, in which a second party also shares
rights, will be subject to claims of the second party’s creditors.
This Article examines intermediary risk in that larger context by
starting from first principles. It shows that the issue of intermediary
risk conceptually turns on whether contracts that allocate partial
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, supra, at 14. Model legislation also has been influential as a
basis for treaties. Thus, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and several capital exporting states, including the United States, have formulated a model
bilateral investment treaty that has been widely adopted. Memorandum from Katherine
Topulos, Foreign & International Law Librarian, Duke University School of Law Library, to
Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Dec. 19, 2000)
(describing a telephone conversation on December 18, 2000, with David Renz, the Bilateral
Investment Treaty Coordinator at the U.S. State Department, in which Mr. Renz informed Ms.
Topulos that all recent treaties were negotiated from the 1994 Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, and many of them are very similar to the model treaty (except for the annex exceptions
which are country-specific), and that of the ten treaties approved by the [U.S.] Senate in 2000,
eight have been based on the Model) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The OECD’s Model
Tax Convention has been similarly influential. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
MODEL TAX CONVENTION (noting that almost 350 treaties between OECD member countries,
and over 1,500 treaties in all, are based on this model), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/fa/
treaties/treaty.htm (last modified Feb. 1, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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property rights between intermediaries and investors should be en-
forceable. Then it analyzes the enforceability of these contracts, con-
cluding they should be enforced notwithstanding externalities im-
posed on creditors of the intermediaries. More simply put, if in the
context of one of these transaction patterns a given transfer of assets
would constitute a sale, then the fact that only an undivided interest
in those assets is being transferred should not defeat sale treatment.
Thus, for each transaction pattern in which intermediary risk arises, a
creditor of the intermediary should not be able to reach an investor’s
undivided interest.
This conclusion, that there should be no intermediary risk, is
normative. In actuality, there remains uncertainty whether external-
ities would prevent contract enforcement, especially given that many
transactions cross national borders. In that context, I analyze how this
normative thesis can be implemented into law that binds parties in
different states, concluding that a model law could best accomplish
this purpose. Finally, I propose a text of such a law.267
267. In that context, I also discuss the relationship between this Article’s model-law
approach to intermediary risk and the conflicts of law approach undertaken by the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. See infra Appendix B.
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APPENDIX A
PROPOSED MODEL LAW TO REGULATE INTERMEDIARY RISK
(a) The transfer of an undivided fractional interest in property
shall constitute a valid and enforceable transfer of that interest to the
same extent and in the same manner as if that interest had been a
separate asset.
(b) The transfer shall not be affected by the fact that the prop-
erty in which the interest is being transferred is itself an undivided
fractional interest.
(c) Holders of property in which undivided interests have been
transferred shall, to the extent of such transfers, be deemed to hold
such property for their transferees, but only transferors and transfer-
ees that are in privity may prosecute rights directly against each other
on account of such transfers.268
268. States that have regulatory schemes protecting investors from the consequences thereof
may wish to consider whether to adopt a non-uniform exception favoring an intermediary’s
secured creditors over investors, as discussed supra in Part IV.B. Also, because the
consequences of enforcement and non-enforcement “may be influenced by the transactional
context,” supra note 177 and accompanying text, this Article only balances the consequences of
enforcement and non-enforcement in three such contexts. See supra Part III.B. States may wish
to consider whether to restrict enactment of the Model Law to those contexts.
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APPENDIX B
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A MODEL-LAW AND CONFLICTS
OF LAW APPROACH
In May 2000, the Hague Conference on Private International
Law placed the issue of intermediary risk on its priority agenda.269 By
its organizational mandate, the Hague Conference intends to address
this risk through conflicts of law rules, as opposed to a model substan-
tive law approach such as that proposed in this Article.270 This Ap-
pendix describes the relationship between these approaches.271
Before doing so, however, it should be noted that there are other
differences between the way in which the Hague Conference and this
Article examine intermediary risk. The Hague Conference only ex-
amines this risk in the indirect holding system for securities.272 This
Article also examines intermediary risk in securitization, loan partici-
pation, and by analogy similar transactions. Furthermore, even within
the indirect holding system for securities, the Hague Conference fo-
cuses on intermediary risk primarily from the standpoint of a party
(such as a lender) extending secured credit to an investor, not from
the standpoint of the investor.273 Yet the issue of intermediary risk is
as important for investors as for lenders. This narrow focus might re-
flect that lenders have been more vocal than investors in demanding a
legal solution. After all, lenders typically rely on counsel and legal
opinions for assurance that their security interests in collateral have
priority over competing claims, and therefore are forced to grapple
with the issue of intermediary risk on a daily basis.274 Investors, in con-
trast, less commonly retain counsel to advise on the legal nature of
269. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 47.
271. The author thanks Francesco Parisi and Larry Ribstein for helpful discussions on
conflict of law issues related to those discussed in this Appendix.
272. BERNASCONI, supra note 44, at 5-6.
273. See id. at 8 (claiming that, “in practice, it is normally in relation to collateral
transactions that the most significant issues tend to arise”).
274. This Article nonetheless addresses a collateral issue not addressed by the Bernasconi
Report: whether an intermediary’s secured creditors should be able to gain priority over
unencumbered property interests previously sold by the intermediary to investors. See supra
note 238 and accompanying text (observing that, although Article 8 of the UCC enables secured
creditors that “control” the intermediary’s interest to gain priority over the investor even
though the investor has not consented to subordinate his interest, “[t]his exception appears
extraordinary because it subordinates a third party’s ownership interest to a security interest
given without consent of the owner”).
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investments in securities; they therefore may be less aware of the is-
sue.275
Setting aside these differences, what is the relationship between a
conflicts of law approach to intermediary risk and one based on a
model substantive law? From a lender’s standpoint, both approaches
must address the problem that intermediary risk undermines the “ab-
solute assurance” needed by lenders that “the collateral being
pledged [to them] is enforceable against third parties.”276 Such assur-
ance requires that “[i]n the event of the insolvency of either the [in-
vestor] as collateral provider, or the financial intermediary, the
[lender] has a perfected interest (either through outright ownership
or a valid security interest) in the collateral, free from the grasp of the
[investor’s], or the financial intermediary’s, other creditors.”277
Under existing legal systems, however, a lender can rarely obtain
this assurance because it will not know, without consulting counsel in
the investor’s, each intermediary’s, the issuer’s, and perhaps other ju-
risdictions, whether its security interest has priority over the inves-
tor’s and each intermediary’s creditors. This uncertainty reflects that,
in an indirect holding system, a proprietary interest in securities may
have a nexus with multiple jurisdictions—that of the issuer’s place of
organisation, the place where the underlying securities are physically
located [in the case of securities evidenced by a certificate], the place
where the register recording the interests [in securities] is main-
tained (assuming the securities are in registered form), the place
where each intermediary maintains its records evidencing the book-
entry interest and the place where the investor is located.278
The transaction costs of consulting counsel in so many jurisdictions
can be prohibitive.
275. Notwithstanding its focus on collateral transactions, the Hague Conference’s approach
might turn out to have broader applicability. See, e.g., BERNASCONI, supra note 44, at 8 (noting
that “there seems to be no reason to distinguish for this purpose title transfers under collateral
transactions from ordinary transfers by way of sale”); see also id. at 61 (concluding that its
conflict of law recommendation “should apply not only to transactions that involve the taking of
collateral but to outright sales of securities that are held through tiers of intermediaries”).
276. Thieffry & Bridson, supra note 44, at 2.
277. Id.; see also BERNASCONI, supra note 44, at 1 (arguing that a lender needs to know,
before extending credit to an investor under the Report’s typical fact pattern, “which
requirements have to be fulfilled so as to ensure that the [lender] will receive an interest that
will prevail over the interests of third parties”).
278. Thieffry & Bridson, supra note 44, at 2; see also BERNASCONI, supra note 44, at 16-17
(presenting a straightforward hypothetical situation to illustrate the complexity of jurisdictional
questions in an indirect holding system).
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A conflicts of law approach would address this problem by im-
posing international rules to clarify which jurisdictions’ laws are ap-
plicable, thereby reducing transaction costs.279
However, a conflicts of law approach cannot, by itself, fully re-
solve this problem. Sometimes conflict of law rules might point, for
example, to a jurisdiction whose substantive law effectively subordi-
nates the lender’s security interest to rights of the investor’s or an in-
termediary’s creditors. Also, the foregoing conflict of law discussion
has assumed that the lender is collateralized by a proprietary interest
in securities. Sometimes there is uncertainty whether the collateral is
a property right in underlying securities or merely an in personam
claim against the immediate intermediary.280 Then, “[n]o collateral
taker would likely assume [the] intermediary insolvency risk.”281
A model-law approach, in contrast, would conclusively solve
these problems to the extent nations harmonize their substantive laws
to clarify that investors in indirect holding systems hold, and there-
fore lenders to such investors would be collateralized by, proprietary
interests in securities as to which lower-tier holders (such as inves-
tors) always have priority over upper-tier holders (such as intermedi-
aries) and their creditors. This is the approach that I have taken in
this Article.282
279. BERNASCONI, supra note 44, at 29, 31-39. A related but lesser concern is that it also
may be difficult to know under the general lex situs conflict of laws rule where the investor’s
interest is located for purposes of perfecting the investor’s transfer of collateral. Thieffry &
Bridson, supra note 44, at 2.
280. BERNASCONI, supra note 44, at 20, 29.
281. Thieffry & Bridson, supra note 44, at 3. Randall Guynn argues, however, that there is
no such uncertainty in intermediary holding systems and that the “only real question that
persists” is whether the nature of the investor’s right is “like an Article 8 ‘security entitlement’
or a Belgian ‘co-property right in a notional pool of securities,’ on the one hand, or whether it is
a traditional property right that is traceable through the intermediaries to the underlying
individual securities, on the other,” a distinction that would influence the choice of law. E-mail
from Randall Guynn, supra note 58. If this is indeed the only open question, then intermediary
risk could be contained by ensuring that transfers of interests in securities are perfected under
applicable law in accordance with the Hague Conference’s conflicts of law approach.
282. See E-mail from Randall Guynn, supra note 58 (concluding that “[o]nly after all
jurisdictions modernise, and ideally standardize[,] their laws[] will we mitigate further the risks,
legal uncertainties and additional costs associated with cross-border collateral transactions”);
see also UNIDROIT Secretariat, supra note 48, at 2 (arguing in support of the need to
harmonize the substantive laws in this area because, even after adoption of a conflicts of law
approach, “numerous legal issues (as well as issues of economic inefficiencies generated by
present arrangements) will have to be addressed”).
